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A b s t r a c t
The object of this study is to determine North Korea's 
position in the Sino-Soviet dispute through an historical 
investigation of the effects of competition between Moscow 
and Peking on the formulation of North Korean foreign policy.
Four basic propositions are set forth as the major 
determinants of North Korean foreign policy. They are the 
following: (l) the pursuit of national interests, (2) the
achievement of Korean reunification, (3) a pragmatic approach 
to external assistance, and (4) the regime's effort to con­
struct a modern self-image. Evidence is presented in the 
form of a descriptive narrative of North Korean foreign 
policy-making from which logical deductions can be derived 
to support the above propositions.
It is suggested that the pursuit of national interests, 
a universal phenomenon in the nation-state system, has in­
fluenced the behavior of Communist satellites, specifically 
North Korea.
It is suggested that North Korea's major policy goal 
is to bring the entire peninsula under its direct control 
through constructing a self-image of a rapidly modernizing 
state.
It is suggested that the P'yongyang regime does not 
discriminate between the means available for achieving the 
above obj'ective and relies upon both Moscow and Peking to 
obtain the best of what each has to offer in the way of 
military and economic assistance.
Furthermore, it is suggested that North Korea's position 
in the Sino-Soviet conflict has been determined largely by 
the nature of its efforts to build a self-image.
The results suggest that competition between Moscow and 
Peking has served to enhance P'yongyang's paramount foreign 
policy goal of reunification and permitted the North Korean 
regime to maintain a relatively "independent" position in 
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
v
NORTH KOREA AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION
INTRODUCTION
Throughout modern history, Korea has occupied the 
unenviable position of being a strategic objective coveted 
by its larger, and often more aggressive Asian neighbors.
Due primarily to its advantageous geographic location, con­
trol of the Korean peninsula has been contested in no less 
than four major wars in the last three quarters of a century. 
The traditional rivals in this struggle for predominance over 
the peninsula have been Japan, Russia, and China. For each 
nation Korea has represented a different prize: a bridge to
the mainland of Asia to Japan, an access to warm water ports 
for Russia, and a centuries-old and erstwhile vassal to China. 
After fighting two wars -- the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 
and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan successfully elim­
inated its two main competitors, thus securing Korea as a 
protectorate in 1905. By 1910, when Korea was fully annexed 
into the Japanese Empire, the international political order 
Korea had known under the Yi dynasty had been completely eradi 
cated by years of alien rule and the contending forces of 
foreign nations.
After thirty-five years of Japanese rule, Korea was 
liberated by the victorious Allied troops in the final days
3of the second World War. At first, Korean leaders welcomed
the Allied occupation, anticipating their country’s prompt
emanicipation from foreign subjugation in accordance with
the Allied proclamations issued at Cairo (1943) and Potsdam 
1
(1945). But the wartime declarations proved ambiguous 
and meaningless, and soon the Koreans realized that the 
initial period of Allied occupation would mean the continued 
foreign domination of their homeland. The occupation arrange­
ments, concluded by the Allied Powers in 1945, served to 
set the stage for renewed international rivalry over the 
Korean peninsula. Although the peninsula was originally 
severed at the thirty-eighth parallel to facilitate American 
and Soviet action against expected Japanese resistance, the 
unforeseen post-war breakdown of Soviet-American cooperation 
and the ensuing Cold War hardened the temporary line of de­
marcation into a permanent armed frontier separating the
2
two spheres of influence.
North and south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the 
Soviet Union and the United States each established a 
"Korean” regime that reflected Soviet and American ideological
■*"U.S., Department of State, The Record of Korean Unifica­
tion , Far Eastern Series 101, Pubn. -7084 (October, 1960), p. 4.
2
Shannon McCune, ’’The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea, ” 
World Politics, I (October, 1948), 223-32.
4positions: the Soviet Union created the Democratic PeopleTs
Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) in the north, while the United 
States established the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) in the 
south. Even though the national boundaries and ideologies 
of the two Koreas have remained virtually unaltered since 
their inception, the international positions of North and 
South Korea have not consistently reflected those of the 
United States and Russia. Rather, the two regimes have ex­
ercised increasing independence in formulating their respective 
foreign policies.
Of the two Korean regimes North Korea,or the D.P.R.K., 
has displayed without a doubt a greater degree of independence, 
or at least non-conformity, with respect to the policies of 
its mentor, the Soviet Union. Needless to say, the inde­
pendent posture of North Korea has been greatly enhanced by 
the internal rupture of the Communist bloc, and the resulting 
Sino-Soviet competition to recruit peripheral Communist 
states into their respective camps.
Historically, North Korea's course of action has been 
determined by its national interests, which have necessitated 
the regime's somewhat ambivalent position with regard to the 
Sino-Soviet dispute. North Korea is not firmly committed to 
either side and remains a point of contention for its two 
traditional Asian rivals. The prize, however is no longer
5possession of a strategic position, now outmoded by the ad­
vanced technology of weapon systems, but rather an ideological 
ally in the intra-bloc Communist struggle.
The subject of this thesis will be an examination of 
the effects of Sino-Soviet competition on North Korea, and 
the emergence of that regime’s nationalistic position within 
the Communist world. Evidence will be presented to support 
the following propositions:
1. The pursuit of national interest, a universal 
phenomenon in the nation-state system, has influenced the 
behavior of Communist satellites, including North Korea, 
given the condition that prevails in the polycentric Communist 
world today.
2. North Korea’s paramount goal is the reunification 
of its divided peninsula by means of constructing a self- 
image of a rapidly modernizing state.
3. The Communist regime in the North does not dis­
criminate between the resources available for achieving 
its obj’ectives and relies on both Peking and Moscow to 
obtain the best that the two Communist giants have to offer.
4. And finally, North K o r e a ’s position in the Sino- 
Soviet conflict is largely determined by the nature of North 
Korean efforts to build a self-image.
6These propositions are interrelated and interacting.
In analyzing North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute with reference to the above propositions, this study 
also seeks to answer the following questions: What are the
tactics and strategies that North Korea has employed in 
attempting to obtain her goal of unification? To what ex­
tent do North Korean policies reflect the Stalinist posture 
of Premier Kim Il-sung? And lastly, what motivated the 
North Koreans to seize the U.S.S. PUEBLO, and what were they 
attempting to gain in the Pueblo Affair?
The traditional approach of historical analysis will 
be employed in this study. Essentially, the manuscript will 
be a descriptive narrative of North Korea's policy-making 
from which logical deductions are derived concerning the 
various influencing factors that determine the regime’s 
position in the struggle between Moscow and Peking.
Finally, a brief comment on the sources and materials 
utilized in this project. Although the author admits that 
a working knowledge of the Korean language would have ex­
panded the number of primary resources available, he feels 
that his lack of facility with the language did not seriously 
hamper his investigation, since many excellent works in 
this field are in English. By drawing on the collections 
of the Swem Library at the College of William and Mary,
7Alderman Library at the University of Virginia, and the 
Library of Congress in Washington, D. C . , many primary and 
secondary sources were found in journals, magazines, news­
papers, and government publications.
Most of the sources consulted were authored by South 
Koreans now residing permanently in the United States and 
teaching at our universities. On the whole, their scholar­
ship, as exhibited in American periodicals, is quite obj'ective 
and demonstrates a penetrating insight of North Korean 
politics. Caution must be exercised, however, in analyzing 
English language materials in Korean publications; for they 
are often times biased, and the facts are frequently un­
reliable. In the United States, the Korean War, and more 
recently the Pueblo Affair, have focused greater attention 
on Korean politics, which has been reflected in the mass 
of literature that has been forthcoming after these events. 
Therefore, the sources presently available in English proved 
adequate for a study of this scope, but they, of course, 
could not compensate entirely for the lack of primary English 
language sources of for the unavailability of accurate in­
formation from the Democratic Peoplers Republic of Korea.
CHAPTER I 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1945-1948
On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union formally declared 
war on the Japanese Empire, and two days later dispatched 
troops across the Korean frontier. Since only scattered 
resistance was encountered from the retreating Japanese 
forces, the Red Army readily secured its area of responsi­
bility, northern Korea. In accordance with General Order 
Number 1, the Soviets pushed down the peninsula to the 
Allies* predesignated rendezvous point in sixteen days, 
arriving at the thirty-eighth parallel a full month ahead of 
the Americans.'*' Apparently, the Soviet Union had failed to 
formulate any specific plans for the future "colonization" 
of Korea at the time of the invasion. In fact, the Russian 
record during the first months of occupation, which will be
more fully discussed later, suggested that the Kremlin was
2grossly ignorant of conditions existing inside Korea.
^For the background on General Order Number 1, see U.S., 
Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification, p. 4.
For evidence supporting this argument, see Dae-Sook 
Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 326.
8
9Indeed, this need not have been the case for the
3
Soviet Far East contained a sizeable Korean population.
Yet, this potential source of intelligence remained unused 
because "Soviet authorities apparently did not encourage 
the activities of Korean revolutionary organizations on 
Soviet t e r r i t o r y . N o r  did the Russians draw on their 
pre-1945 experiences in dealing with Asian minorities and 
Outer Mongolia to construct a blueprint tor a Korean 
satellite. Nevertheless, the Soviets did have one overriding 
priority tor the post-war reconstruction of Korea: insur­
ing the establishment of a "friendly" government on Russia's 
eastern frontier.
In attempting to fulfill this imperialistic ambition 
of Korean subservience, the U.S.S.R. formulated its Korean 
policy around the following two objectives: First, a mechanism
had to be instituted through which the complete responsive­
ness of the Korean government to the dictates and interests 
of the Soviet Union would be insured; and second, the same
3There were an estimated 300,000 Koreans inside the 
Soviet Union in the pre-war period. See Walter Kolarz,
The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (New York: Praeger,
1954).
4
Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Re­
public (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966),
pp. 19-20.
10
government had to be capable of perpetuating itself in 
power and exploiting any potentialities for growth.
More specifically, the Kremlin formulated its policy
with certain basic aims in mind, namely (1) the creation of
a strong indigenous regime, (2) the suitability of the Soviet
political system -- specifically the concentration of
authority and employment of coercion -- as a model for the
indigenous regime, (3) the reservation of internal political
power in the hands of Soviet officials or trusted Koreans,
and (4) the necessity of "reform" programs and a "democratic"
popular facade to procure mass support for the regime and
6preserve the fiction of an independent state. In the end, 
the Soviet course of action proved to be highly successful.
As Ro Chung-hyun stated, "In a little more than three years 
after August 1945, the Soviet Union achieved in north Korea 
something never within sight of the Japanese after forty 
years of colonial control: the Soviet Union was able to
withdraw its occupation army, set up an apparently inde­
pendent regime, and still exercise firm control over north 
Korea.
-*U.S. , Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study
in the Techniques of Takeover, Far Eastern Series 103, Pubn, 
7118 (January, 1961), p. 5.
6t . ,
Ibid., p . 13.
7
Chung-hyun Ro, "Economic Growth and Manpower Adminis­
tration in North Korea," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), p. 151.
11
Undoubtedly, certain fortuitous circumstances greatly
enhanced the "sovietization" of war-torn northern Korea.
8Not only was Korea contiguous to the Soviet Union and under 
Soviet military occupation, but its relatively small size, 
shattered political organizations, and colonial history created 
a favorable climate for Russian imperialism. Perhaps the com­
plete absence of political parties was the most crucial factor 
facilitating a Soviet takeover. Rudolph wrote:
The case in Korea is unique in that, having 
been governed by the Japanese for forty years, 
the Koreans had no government or political 
parties of their own at the end of the war. 
Consequently, the Communists were spared 
the necessity gf smashing an existing politi­
cal structure.
Overall, K o r e a ’s colonial experience witnessed the annihila­
tion of traditional folkways and the destruction of internal 
order. Japanese colonialism was best described by Gregory 
Henderson, who said "Chosen /Korea/ was clasped in a vice- 
like grip by the Japanese military with ubiquitous security 
pre-occupations: the instruments of repression weighed far
more heavily than in colonial India, Africa, and Southeast Asia.
®The D.P.R.K.and the U.S.S.R. share an 11 mile common 
frontier.
9
Philip Rudolph, North K o r e a ’s Political and Economic 
Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959),
p. 17.
"^Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 72.
12
In addition, two external conditions proved to be 
highly favorable to the TTsovietizationTT process. The first 
was the previously mentioned reservoir of Koreans residing 
in the eastern provinces of the U.S.S.R. Following the 
liberation, many of these Koreans returned to their home­
land on the heels of the Soviet soldiers. Because of their 
loyalty to the Soviet Union a major criterion for Korean 
officials, they were frequently selected to execute certain 
administrative and political functions in the occupation 
government. Their presence in post-war Korea enabled the 
Russians to implement a system of indirect rule. The second 
was the chaotic, internal conditions gripping the Soviet 
Union’s major Asian rival, China, which eliminated China as 
a potential competitor after the war. Uoong-tack Kim re­
called that China had periodically tried to reclaim its 
traditional position of influence over the peninsula, and 
both the Nationalists and Communist Chinese considered Korea 
a portion of their "lost territories.”'*'"*' For instance, as
early as 1936, Mao Tse-tung intimated a sphere of Chinese
12
influence extended over Korea. Barring the internal strife 
11Uoong Tack Kim, ”Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea” 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 
1967), pp. 29-30.
12Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove
Press, 1961), p. 96.
13
which enveloped his country at the w a r ’s close, Chiang
Kai-sek probably would have attempted to reassert China's
old ties with the Korean peninsula.
Thus, when the Russians entered Korea in late August
1945, they met conditions that lent themselves perfectly
to the creation of a satellite regime. These advantages
were further enhanced by the lack of foreign competition
and the institution of an ostensibly autonomous political
apparatus. The latter consisted solely of Korean nationals,
since the Soviets were content to sit on the sidelines and
13
call the plays. Such an indirect form of rule never
could have been implemented without the arrival of the
Soviet-Koreans.
These Soviet-Koreans had not participated as a group
in any of the previous Korean independence movements and
14
had lost touch with their homeland. Most of them were 
second-generation descendants of Korean revolutionaries, 
who had sought refuge in the Soviet provinces of Uzbekistan
^ B y u n g  Chul K o h , The Foreign Policy of North Korea:
A Study in Communist Rhetoric and Behavior (New York: Praeger,
1969), p. 2.
14
For a background of Soviet-Korean activities in the 
pre-1945 period, see U.S., Department of State, North Korea, 
p. 13.
14
and Kazakhstan from Japanese persecution in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. For the most part, they 
were long-time residents of the U.S.S.R., students in leading 
Soviet schools, members of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), 
and participants in local government in their Soviet communi­
ties.^5 Naturally, Soviet administrators would rely heavily 
on such individuals to fill the newly created positions of 
authority in their zone of occupation. "The basic Russian 
strategy," according to Paige, "was to place native Koreans -- 
some rather inept, but all undoubtedly responsive to Com­
munist direction -- in positions of the highest formal
authority, and to place Soviet-Koreans or Russian advisers
16
in locations of de facto power." Ho Ka i , for example, a
Korean and former member of the Central Committee of a
Soviet Central Asian Republic became the architect of the
Communist Party in North Korea and "perhaps the most power-
17
ful official in the regime." Although they remained 
essentially in the background, the Soviet-Koreans formed an
^ F o r  the personal backgrounds of the Soviet-Koreans, 
see Ibid.
16Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 29.
17
Cohng-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, "The Russian Faction 
in North Korea," Asian Survey. VIII (April, 1968),-275-76; 
and U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 3.
15
important, final link in the Soviet chain of command, which
18
extended down from the Kremlin to the Korean community.
Wisely, the Soviets obscured the presence of the Soviet- 
Koreans. As a group, they were resented because they retained 
their Soviet citizenship and CPSU membership, therefore, 
enjoying dual Soviet-Korean citizenship and party membership. 
This status was extremely valuable in that the Soviet-Koreans 
could avail themselves of the special privileges reserved c 
for the occupation personnel, such as access to stores dis­
tributing scarce goods. Generally, it was not so much their 
favored status that provoked resentment as it was the Soviet- 
Koreans1 "arrogant air of Cultural superiority."^^
Accompanying the Soviet-Korean entry into Korea were 
about three hundred Korean partisans. These guerrilla 
fighters had conducted anti-Japanese activities from bases
in south eastern Manchuria and apparently had spent the final
20war years in the Soviet Union. This group is frequently 
called the "Kapsan faction"; the name being derived from
18For the strongest case maintaining that the Soviet- 
Koreans dominated the political scene, see U.S., Department 
of State, North K o rea; however, this argument is often dis­
puted, see Sae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement.
^ G l e n n  D. Paige and Dong Ju Lee, "The Post-war 
Politics of Communist Korea," China Quarterly, No. 14 
(1963), p. 23.
Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 317.
16
their 1937 victory over the Japanese at the battle of
Poch'onbo near the Korean town of Kapsan. More recently,
authors have preferred the label "partisan group" because
in the first years of the occupation this faction was not
21sharply differentiated from the Soviet-Korean faction.
The partisan group centered around its ranking officer,
Kim Il-sung -- a thirty-three year old major in the Red 
Army.22
The Soviet-Koreans and Kim Il-sung's forces were not 
the only exiles to return in the first post-liberation
months. In fact, numerically, the largest group came from
/
23
the Communist controlled areas of northern China. Col­
lectively known as Yenan Koreans, this group had both a 
military and political background of Korean independence 
movements. Organized militarily as the Korean Volunteer 
Corps,the Yenan faction first received military training
21For Dae-Sook S u h 1s persuasive argument that the 
term "Kapsan faction" is a misnomer, see K o h , The Foreign 
Policy of North Korea, p. 33.
22 ^
Although most accounts describe Kim Il-sung as a
Soviet officer, Dae-Sook Suh states, "There is no confirma­
tion . . .  of his relations with the Russians or the Russian 
Army in Russia during 1941-45. . . . It is primarily be­
cause of the undue favor Kim won after the liberation of 
Korea that the rumor of his service in the Russian Army is 
more convincing." Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 292-93
2 3For the background of the Yenan Communist faction, 
see Chong-sik Lee, "Korean Communists and Yenan," China 
Quarterly, No. 9 (1962), pp. 182-92.
17
from the Nationalist Chinese Army but its later develop­
ment was under the aegis of the Chinese Communists. By 
the time of the Japanese capitulation, the corps was a
well-trained and battle-tested fighting force boasting of
24
three to four hundred veteran officers. In the political
sphere, the Yenan Koreans organized the Korean Independence
25
Alliance under the guidance of Kim Tu-bong in 1942. With 
such a well-structured organization, the Yenan group posed 
a powerful threat to Soviet-Korean domination in Korean 
politics.
Worried that the Chinese-trained Koreans would upset
their post-war plans, Soviet occupation forces vigorously
opposed Yenan advances. An excellent example of Soviet
suspicion was the reception the Yenan faction received when
it first arrived at the Korean border.
At first they were refused permission to 
enter North Korea, and 4,000 armed Yenan 
Koreans were halted at the Yalu River 
bridges in late 1945. After considerable 
bickering, the Soviet command in P ’yongyang 
at length cabled permission for them to
enter the border city of Sinuiju, where
24Chong-sik Lee, ’’Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean 
War Stage,” China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 9.
25For the details of the Korean Independence Alliance’s 
organization, see Chong-sik Lee, Politics of Korean Nation­
alism (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press,
1966), p. 221.
18
they were put up for the night in a high- 
school building —  only to be surrounded 
and disarmed before morning by the local 
"self-defense” f o r c e s . ^
Throughout 1945, members of the Korean Volunteer Corp were
i.
refused entry into the Soviet occupation zone; however, a
few, like commanding General Mu Chong, managed to cross
27
the border as a private citizen. Regardless of Soviet 
attempts to emasculate the Yenan faction, this group sur­
vived to challenge the Soviet-Koreans monopolistic control.
An indigenous Communist movement had managed to outlive 
the period of Japanese colonialism, but it suffered from
2 8internal divisions and repeated attempts at suppression.
The movement had a relatively long history in Korea. Ac­
cording to Henderson,
Koreans were among the first people in Asia 
to come into contact with Communism, and its 
spread among them was, initially, quite rapid. 
Koreans . . . had spilled across the north
eastern border into the Maritime Provinces 
in large numbers from the time of the Taewon'gun 
on. . . Communism established rapport with
many such Koreans, not only because of its
^^Joungwon Alexander Kim, T,The Long March of Premier 
Kim,” The New York Times Magazine, Peb. 25, 1968, p. 33.
27Jae-souk Sohn, ’factionalism and Party Control of 
the Military in Communist North Korea,” Koreana Quarterly, 
IX (Autumn, 1967), 20.
p o
For a general history of the Korean Communist move­
ment from its birth to 1945, see Robert A. Scalapino and 
Chong-sik Lee, "Origins of the Korean Communist Movement,” 
Journal of Asian Studies, XX (November, 1960), 149-167.
19
summons to revolution and anti-colonialism, 
but because of Korean political and military 
identity of interest with the attempt of the 
new Bolshevik state to dislodge Japan from 
its post-World War I position in the Maritime 
Provinces.
In the Maritime Provinces, the Irkutsk Communist party had
formed a Korean section as early as January 1918, and six
months later a Korean Socialist party was organized at 
30
Khabarovsk.
On the peninsula, a Korean Communist party enjoyed
an active existence from 1925 to 1928. Plagued by dissent
and factionalism, internal strife paralyzed the movement to
such an extent that the Comintern disbanded the party for
31"incessant factionalism" in December 1928. Nevertheless,
a portion of the cells endured the repressive colonial
environment, which actually may have nourished them by
forging their membership closer together as a means of .
self-defense. Paige concluded that "the pre-1945 Communist
movement seemed to have been characterized by the clandestine
32activities of tiny Communist factions."
29Henderson, K orea, p. 312.
^ S e e  Ibid.
31David Daliin, Soviet Russia and the Far Bast (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 52.
32Glenn D. Paige, "Korea," in Communism and Revolution: 
The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, ed. by Cyril E. 
Black and Thomas P. Thornton (Princeton,4 N.J. : Princeton
University Press, 1964), p. 218.
20
Aside from the fact that their party apparatus was
badly diffused after the war, the domestic Communist faction
was further handicapped by the absence of its major leaders.
Expecting the imminent reunification of their country, most
Communist leaders had flocked to Seoul in the American
occupation zone and made it the center of party activity.
Only a few veteran Communists of any note, such as O Ki-sop
33
and Hyon Chun-hyok, retained their roots in the north.
The shortage of prominent domestic Communists necessitated 
the recruitment of local, obscure party members for positions 
in the Soviet controlled zone. By concentrating in the south, 
the domestic Communist faction created a void which enabled 
the foreign Communist factions to gain power. As Suh re­
marked :
Had the Communists consolidated their forces in
the North under the Russians, as the Nationalists
did in the South under the Americans . . .  it
would then have been extremely difficult, if not
totally impossible, for Kim Il-sung and his
revolutionaries to advance to positions of such
. . 34prominence m  so short a period of time.
Only after the old Communists awoke to the permanence
of their homeland's division and experienced complete failure
■^Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p . 4.
34Suh, The Korean Communists Movement, p. 301.
21
in the south did they begin to seek the protection of the
Soviet fold. However, they arrived much too late to secure
a foothold in the north Korean regime. Beaten in all
their attempts to reach the pinnacle of authority, the
domestic Communists withdrew from the main political arena
and deluded themselves with thoughts of future unification
and their ultimate domination. In fact, the supposedly
temporary developments in the north led many old Communists
35to ignore and belittle those in power. Very quickly, the 
domestic Communists would suffer the tragic consequences of 
their mistaken judgment and critical attitude.
Still, the domestic Communists, who had remained in the 
north, proved to be no more successful than their brothers 
in the south. Reaching the ideologically correct conclu­
sion that Korea was still undergoing the stages of a 
bourgeois revolution as described by Marx, the local Com-, 
munists completely ignored the realities inherent in the 
Soviet occupation. Therefore, instead of forming the van­
guard of the revolution the old Communists took a back seat 
and favored Nationalist initiatives. The entire program of 
the local Communist leader, Hyon Chun-hyok, obscured the 
importance of Communism and became too closely identified
~^*Ibid, p. 312.
22
36with the ideals of Korean nationalism. Obviously,
Hyon's thoughts and actions did not endear him to the Soviet
officialdom. On September 28, 1945, he was shot in broad
daylight in front of P Tyongyang City Hall after emerging
from a conference with the Soviet commandant. His assassin
37was never apprehended.
It is evident, then, that the old Communists committed 
two flagrant errors which caused their influence to be 
supplanted by the foreign factions. First, an overwhelming 
majority abandoned their strongest potential power base in 
pursuit of political gain in the south. Second, the rem­
nants of the party in the north totally misj'udged the 
political situation by adopting the Nationalists 1 cause. 
Because of its anti-foreign bias, nationalism posed a threat 
to Soviet hegemony and forced them to exclude the domestic 
Communist faction from the post-liberation leadership. In­
deed, a tragic comedy of errors on the part of the old 
Communists resulted in the ascendancy of the Soviet-Korean 
and Yenan factions.
In discussing the various political factions existing
^Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea,” China Qtly.. 
No. 14 (1963), p. 6.
37 .For details of the assassination, see ibid.
in post-liberation Korea, the non-Communist groups cannot
be omitted for they occupied the center of the political
stage in the period immediately following the Japanese
surrender. The nationalists composed the most important
faction, of which the Korean Democratic Party, created in
November 1945, formed the nucleus. Cho Man-sik, the party’s
chief architect, skillfully joined the nationalists, Christian
leaders, and community leaders from the various provinces
38
into this coalition party.
Frequently in open conflict with Soviet policies,
such as grain and land reform programs, the Democratic
Party and its leaders did not gain the favor of the Soviet
officials, and as a result, its initial prominance was 
39short-lived. The party’s opposition to the Korean trustee­
ship plan under the auspices of the United Nations finally
40brought about Soviet repression. Cho Man-sik was charged 
with defying the Soviet administrators, imprisoned, and
38Ibid., p . 4.
Ibid., p . 5.
40The plan was formulated at the December 1945 Mos­
cow Foreign Ministers Conference and the Communist factions 
inside Korea parroted the Soviets support for the plan.
For the details of the proposed Korean trusteeship, see 
U.S., Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification, 
p. 5.
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41later reported executed by Russian occupation forces.
His arrest in January 1946 set off a panic among Korean 
nationalists and the party was destroyed as they fled south 
for safety. The persecution of the nationalists indicated 
the Soviet’s intolerance of dissent and their firm resolve 
to establish a Communist state in northern Korea.
In order to ensure the Soviet orientation of the 
newly created regime in northern Korea, the Kremlin con­
cluded that it was necessary to eliminate, or at least 
neutralize, all the Soviet-Korean faction’s rivals, In­
cluding Kim Il-sung’s partisan group. In line with their 
policy of indirect rule, the Russian occupation authorities 
sought a native Korean to implement the proposed plan of 
political consolidation. Ultimately, Kim Il-sung was 
selected. His selection was not surprising, in that Kim 
possessed all the prerequisites for the task: "He was a
Communist professing to serve their interests, and he had
a record of anti-Japanese revolutionary activity under the
- 42popular pseudonym of Kim Il-song, known to many Koreans."
Chong-sik Lee believed the "crucial factor" in K i m ’s 
selection "was the simple fact that he had been in eastern
41
Tae-ho Kim, "The Ruling System of North Korean 
Regime," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 179-80.
^3Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 313.
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Siberia since 1941."4 ^ Lee asserted that the choice of a
leader was made before Russia's entry into the war and that
Soviet leaders presumably knew Kim because of his war-time
44cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Actually, Kim Il-sungfs 
activities and whereabouts from 1941 to 1945, as well as 
the exact time of the Russian decision to promote Kim as 
a Korean hero and figurehead of the occupation government, 
are extremely hard to document. Therefore, let it suffice 
to say simply that the choice of Kim was a "logical one" 
in the absence of any relationship between the Korean Com-
45
munists and the Russians prior to the close of World War II.
In accordance with Soviet plans, Kim Il-sung was pre­
sented to the Korean people in an elaborate welcoming ceremony 
in P'yongyang on October 10, 1945. Evidently, Soviet author­
ities felt that Kim should be promoted as a genuine Korean
46hero rather than an auxiliary to a foreign movement. However,
Kim was such a relatively young man, thirty-three years old
, ^^Chong-sik Lee, fTKim Il-song of North Korea," Asian 
Survey, VII (June, 1967), 378.
44Ibid.
45. For a defense of this statement see Suh, The Korean 
Communist Movement, p. 313.
^^Chong-sik Lee, "Kim Il-song of North Korea," Asian 
Survey, VII (1967), 382.
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in 1945, that very few actually believed his revolutionary
47
past. It was the Soviet, and later North Korean, efforts 
to shore up K i m Ts revolutionary reputation that have completely 
distorted the record of his pre-1945 activities. Often 
events in K i m rs life were pure fabrication. For example, 
the least credible part of the Kim Il-sung legend is the
allegation that Kim became a "general" at the age of nine-
48
teen. But Dae-Sook Suh, who probably has compiled the
49most objective and factual account of K i m ’s life, main­
tained that Kim did have TTa revolutionary past, not as 
splendid as he claims and perhaps not devoted solely to 
the spread of Communism in Korea or to the independence of 
Korea, but still a revolutionary record of some repute,
50
of which any man thirty-three years old could be proud.”
The major controversy concerning Kim Il-sung centers
51
around his true identity. Around the turn of the century,
a legendary, patriotic hero named Kim Il-sung was said to
47Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 318.
48Koh, The Foreign Policy of North K o r e a , p . 6.
4^Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 256-93.
5QIbid. , p. 261.
^ T h e  true identity of the legendary Kim II Sung has 
never been uncovered.
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have courageously fought against the Japanese and become 
widely admired by the Korean people. Because of his age,
Kim could never have been involved in these legendary ex­
ploits. Thus, it seems that the present premier of North 
Korea was Just one of many who adopted the popular pseudonym, 
"Kim Il-song" during the anti-Japanese struggle of the 1930s 
and 1940s.
Although the material is sketchy, Kim's personal his­
tory is valuable because his background has, at times, in­
fluenced decisions effecting the whole course of North Korea. 
Born on April 15, 1912 in northern Korea, Kim originally 
was named Kim Song-Ju. While he was still very young, his 
family left Korea for Manchuria. Subsequently, Kim spent 
his most formative years outside of Korea in a Chinese 
environment. A commonly ignored fact in North Korean history 
books is that Kim attended Chinese schools while in Manchuria. 
According to Suh, "It was not because there were no Korean 
schools in Manchuria that he attended the Chinese schools; 
he must have done so by choice, for there were many Korean
schools in Kirin." It is believed that Kim's Chinese
—  - —  5 3
education had a definite "impact on /his/ future activities."
52Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 263. 
53Ibid.. p. 264.
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In part, his educational experience may explain the 
fact that Kim was neither a member of the Korean Communist 
movement nor an active participant in Korean nationalist 
causes. Rather Kim joined the Chinese-sponsored military 
organization, known as the Northeast Anti-Japanese United 
Army (NEAJUA). Throughout the 1930s, K i m ’s guerrilla unit 
of approximately one hundred men was under the overall com­
mand of General Yang Ching-yii, head of the NEAJUA and
member of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese
54Communist Party. Therefore, until Kim and his guerrilla 
band ventured into Siberia, his only experience wifh the 
Communist movement had been confined to the Mao Tse-tung 
variety.
Once on Soviet soil, Kim opportunely transferred his 
allegience to the CPSU. His activities during the years he 
spent in Siberia are not at all clear, but it seems that 
he had some connection with the Soviet armed forces since 
he wore the uniform of a Red Army major in 1945. However, 
when Kim Il-sung entered Korea, he was not a "Made in Russia" 
Communist in the same sense as the Russianized Koreans who
^4For details, see Sohn, ’factionalism and Party 
Control of the Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana 
Q t l y .« IX (1967), 18.
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had also arrived with the Soviet Army. Kim Il-sung, 
then, was as unique as the conditions that produced him -- 
a Chinese-trained, Soviet supported, Korean revolutionary 
hero.
Kim owed his rapid rise in North Korean politics to 
his country's liberators and not to popular support among 
the Korean people. In terms of mere survival, not to mention 
advancement, Kim had no other viable alternative than to 
cooperate and obey the occupation officials. He lacked any 
form of power base from which to operate, for the native 
Korean Communists considered him an alien and even his 
partisan supporters were not unified solidly behind him.
But with Soviet support, his natural Machiavellian talents,
and borrowed tactics from his political mentor, Joseph
Stalin, Kim survived the arduous climb to the peak of authority.
K i m ’s pattern of consolidating power was reminiscent 
of Stalin’s approach in that he shared power and responsi­
bility with rival groups, but when they exhausted their
56
usefullness, he purged the rivals from the party. K i m ’s
"^Robert A. Scalapino, ’’The Foreign Policy of North 
Korea,” China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 45.
5 6
For an account of his Stalinist technique, see 
Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," in The Communist 
Revolution in A s i a , ed. by Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 116.
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first efforts at consolidation involved the threatening 
domestic Communist faction. Exhibiting "unwarranted self-
assurance and over confidence," the native Communists lent
57themselves perfectly to their own systematic elimination.
A  variety of tactics were employed in the purge of the 
domestic Communist faction. They ranged from cold­
blooded murder in the case of Hyon Chun-hyok to engineering
58an alliance between the Yenan and Soviet-Korean factions.
By eliminating the old Communists from the political arena, 
Kim Il-sung and his supporters could adopt their mantel in 
posing as the true Communist group devoid of foreign in­
fluence.
Shortly after his arrival in P ’yongyang, Kim Il-sung
had played a most instrumental role in the formation of the
59
North Korean Branch Bureau of the Communist Party. Eager 
to create a Communist party structure more in line with their 
foreign policy objectives, Soviet authorities called the 
Conference of the North Korean Five Party Representatives
57Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 232.
58Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea,” China 
Qtly.« No. 14 (1963), p. 20.
59
The North Korean Branch Bureau was created on October 
13, 1945. For background, see Suh, The Korean Communist Move 
mervt, pp. 316-19.
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and Enthusiasts to meet in P'yongyang on October 10, 1945.
The Kremlin decided there was much less risk in initiating a 
new party than in reviving the more-or-less dormant Korean 
Communist Party. Today, North Korean text books credit 
the Soviet-inspired Bureau with being the "first Korean 
Communist Party organization established on the principle 
of Marxism-Leninism and guided by true Communism.
Surprisingly, it was not Kim Il-sung, who had done 
much of the organizational work for the Bureau, but Kim 
Yong-bom who was elected secretary of the organization. How­
ever, Kim Il-sung assumed the leadership of the Bureau, re­
named the North Korean Communist Party,, two months later.^
At this time, the Yenan faction was also in the process 
of political reorganization. The title Korean Independence 
League was dropped in favor of the New Peoplefs Party on 
March 30, 1946. Under the guidance of Chairman Kim Tu-bong, 
the party appealed to the more literate and well-to-do 
elements of North Korean society. In fact, it enjoyed such 
wide popularity that Soviet administrators became alarmed and 
North Korean Communist Party members grew envious. Finally,
^ C h o n g - s i k  Lee, "Politics in North Korea," China 
Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 6-7.
^ S e e , Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 8.
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Soviet authorities decided the best strategy was to abandon 
their attempts to form an exclusive, Soviet-Korean Communist 
party and to amalgamate the New People's Party into an 
amorphous group to lessen their influence.
By the summer of 1946, Soviet apprehension over the
increasing strength of the Yenan faction and the possibility
>
of Yenan leaders attempting to integrate their party with
the Chinese Communist movement demanded immediate action.
A joint North Korean Communist Party-New People's Party
Conference was summoned in P'yongyang. There the delegates
of both groups agreed to a merger of the two parties into
a single organization to be known as the North Korean
Worker's Party, or the NKWP, and having a membership of
62roughly 160,000. In the early phases of the conference, 
Yenan delegates were openly contemptuous of the proposed 
amalgamation but Kim Tu-bong rallied his party to the support 
of the merger by stating that it "was necessitated not 
only by the tactical need for unity, but by the lack of 
intellectual leadership in the North Korean Communist 
P a r t y . T h e  formation of the NKWP not only marked the
The membership count was given in John N. Washburn, 
"Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," Pacific 
Affairs, XXIII (March, 1950), 60.
- Cited in Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 321.
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end of an independent Yenan Korean party but also clearly 
separated the Soviet-sponsored Communist movement in the 
north from the indigenous Korean Communist Party in Seoul.
As a mere formality, the conference held an election 
for party chairman but all present knew Kim Il-sung was 
slated to be the victor. The Yenan faction, however, be­
came uneasy and criticized Soviet attempts to railroad Kim 
Il-sung into the office. According to reliable accounts,
Their /the Yenan faction/ unfavorable reaction 
was so obvious that the Russian colonel present 
on the dais as an honoured guest advised a 
temporary recess. Upon reconvening, a Communist 
delegate, O Ki-sop argued (as instructed) that 
the chairman need not necessarily be Kim Il- 
sung, and his speech won thunderous applause 
from the New People's Party delegates.64
Later, Kim Il-sung personally nominated Yenan leader Kim 
Tu-bong for the chairmanship in order to allay their fears 
of Soviet-Korean domination. Kim Tu-bong was, indeed, 
elected chairman and Kim Il-sung was rewarded with a vice­
chairmanship; an honor he shared with a relatively unknown
65member of the domestic Communist faction, Chu Nyong-ha.
The Soviets did not lose anything by sacrificing the
64
Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea," China 
Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 10-11.
^^Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North 
Korea," p. 37.
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chairman for the Yenan faction might have bolted the 
union had they pressed the selection of Kim Il-sung. Also, 
regardless of whom was elected leader of the NKWP, the 
power relationship would not be drastically altered for 
the Russian troops still occupied the streets and Kim 
Il-sung remained as their link between the Kremlin and 
the Korean populace.
In the South, Pak Hon-yong formally recognized the 
split in the Korean Communist Party by organizing the South 
Korean Workerfs Party (SKWP), with headquarters in Seoul.
66
Although it claimed to have a membership of over 370,000, 
the party was never a viable instrument of control due to 
continuous factional disputes and harassment from the South 
Korean authorities. When the SKWP structure began to crumble, 
the membership streamed north but they were entirely too 
disorganized to challenge effectively the NKWP for leader­
ship. Therefore, the combined purge of the kunqnae (domestic) 
faction in the north and establishment of the NKWP guaranteed 
the future domination of the foreign faction.
Another bastion of Yenan influence, the Korean Volunteer 
Corps, was also neutralized by combining it with Soviet- 
controlled forces, such as the Peace Preservation Corps and
Ibid., p. 42.
the Railroad Guards, under the banner of the Korean People’s
67
Liberation Army. To prevent Chinese influence in the 
Korean People’s Liberation Army, Soviet administrators saw 
to it that the officers corps was composed of recruits from 
Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla band and returnees from the Soviet 
Maritime Provinces. There was, however, a notable ex­
ception: Yenan Communist Mu Chung, a veteran of the Chinese
688th Route Army, was commissioned as second in command.
Actually, plans for the Korean People’s Liberation 
Army were rushed to completion in 1947, when Lin Piao's 
army in Manchuria was caught by a Nationalist Chinese of­
fensive and forced to retreat toward the Korean frontier. 
Kiwon Chung believed that "probably Kim and possibly the 
Russians became increasingly alarmed least the Yenan 
faction should feel encouraged by the proximity of Chinese
Communist forces, and called for the rapid creation of
• - ,,69
military forces. Once established, the Korean army
became entirely dependent upon the Soviet Union for training
^^For background,, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses 
the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 43.
^ H e n r y  Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Washington:
Korean Pacific Affairs Press, 1947), p. 72.
^^Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People’s Army and
Party," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 108.
and equipment. For instance, under a clandestine program, 
roughly 10,000 men, the best of the Korean ranks, were dis­
patched to the Soviet Union, where they received military,
71technical, and political training.
Since there were no alternative sources of guidance 
or economic assistance available, the Korean armed forces 
had to accept Soviet domination. General Chu Teh, Commander 
in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Armies, states in 1947:
Fighting is going on fiercely in Manchuria.
All our troops are busily engaged. It would
be impossible for us to help others.^2
Surely, the Soviet background of the Korean officer corps 
served to perpetuate Russian influence within the military.
In addition to an army and a party, the Soviet Union 
passed down another legacy -- a civilian structure of 
government -- to the people of North Korea. Japanese 
authorities, in anticipation of their eventual defeat, had 
begun to transfer certain administrative duties to local 
Korean officials in the final weeks of the war. Later, 
local p e o p l e ’s committees were formed to preserve order in
70U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 114.
71 For this example see Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean 
People’s Army and Party," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 107
^ The New York Times , March 10, 1947, p. 2.
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the wake of the Japanese withdrawal. Post-war Korean politics
was officially born with the establishment of Lyuh ?s Com-
73
mittee on August 15, 1945. The Committee changed its 
name to the Korean Peoplefs Republic in early September, 
and carried on operations on either side of the thirty- 
eighth parallel.
As they advanced down the peninsula in pursuit of 
the Japanese, Soviet officers found that the people’s 
committees were a convenient mechanism for administering 
local affairs in the newly liberated areas. They proved 
to be so popular with Russian administrators that in areas 
where committees had not been established the Russians 
created them. For example, in P ’yongyang, political dis­
cord among rival leaders prevented the formation of a 
people’s committee until the Soviet commander intervened 
and authorized a small group of Koreans, under the leader­
ship of a Communist, to set up a provisional people’s 
74committee. Pleased with the initial operation of the 
committees, the Soviets abandoned plans for a military 
government and decided to use the committees as a civilian
73Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, p. 116.
74For example see Rudolph, North Korea’s Political
and Economic Structure, p . 9.
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front for the occupation government. On August 25, 1945, 
the Soviet command ordered the Executive Committee of the 
Korean People to assume the administrative powers of the 
Korean government.^
In many ways, the sanctioning of the people's com­
mittees as the official government proved to be extremely 
beneficial for the Soviet Union. Since they were ignorant 
of internal developments and conditions, the Russians 
could avail themselves of a pre-established governmental 
structure. By hiding behind the civilian facade, the Red 
Army gave the "appearance of encouraging local Korean 
government while retaining power securely in its own 
hands." Within the committees, pressure was brought to 
bear on untrustworthy members,and dissidents were often 
purged as in the case of Cho Man-sik. Even though they 
were extremely active in committee affairs, however, Soviet 
political officers were generally kept well in the background.
Cho Man-sik became the first post-liberation head of 
state in northern Korea when he was appointed chairman of
75George M. McCune, "Post War Government and Politics 
of Korea," The Journal of Politics, IX (November, 1947), 619.
7 Rudolph, North Korea’s Political and Economic
Structure, p. 9.
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the Provisional Political Committee. Soon it was succeeded
by the Five Provinces Administration Bureau which Cho also 
77
headed. Both governmental bodies had jurisdiction and 
authority throughout the Soviet zone of occupation. Following 
a governmental shake up -- stemming from the purge of the 
nationalists’ faction, the North Korean Interim People’s 
Committee was formed on February 7, 1946 to replace the 
Bureau. The Interim People’s Committee restricted con­
siderably the amount of local autonomy allowed to the regional
78
p e o p l e ’s committees. As an additional precaution against 
another outbreak of nationalist sentiment, as was ex­
perienced under the Bureau’s administration, Kim Il-sung 
was appointed .chairman instead of a native Korean as had 
been the practice. The passing of the Bureau marked the 
demise of nationalist power and influence in Korean politics 
and the ascendance of the Soviet-Koreans and Kim Il-sung.
The Soviets consolidated all of their administrative 
and political programs under the Interim People’s Committee. 
Almost immediately, Chairman Kim introduced a package of
The Bureau assumed control from the Provisional 
Committee in October, 1945.
78
Wilbert G. Dubin, ’’The Political Evolution of the 
Pyongyang Government,” Pacific Affairs, XXIII (December, 
1950), 381-82.
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twenty reform measures dealing with agriculture, finance,
education, welfare, and transportation. Although the U.S.S.R.
was in no position to be generous in the post-war period,
it did encourage and assist the economic rehabilitation of
North Korea. The government stressed industrial education
and Russian instructors came in to fill the demand for
experienced personnel. (Reportedly, these instructors
trained 1,500 experts and 2,000 skilled laborers alone
79in January 1947. ) In addition, the Interim People’s
Committee’s early projects were financed from a 212 million
80
ruble low interest loan from the Soviet Union.
In search of popular support, the Soviets instructed 
the government to inaugurate programs involving land re­
form and nationalization of large industry. So rapid was 
the nationalization process that after a year of Soviet
81
rule 90 percent of the major industries had been nationalized. 
Lattimore described the ease with which the factories were 
taken o v e r :
George McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 185.
^^See, Yoon T. Kuark, ’’North K o r e a ’s Industrial 
Development During the Post-War Period,” China Quarterly,
No. 14 (1963), p. 61.
81 Paige, The Korean People’s Democratic Republic, p. 30.
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Because they had belonged to the Japanese, 
no Koreans had been expropriated. . . . Cut
off from Japan it could not stand alone and 
had to be integrated with Russian industry 
in Siberia. The Russians had only to or­
ganize labor unions, import technicans and 
begin to train a new Korean management under 
nationalized ownership.
Land reform traditionally has been a valuable propa­
ganda instrument, and the Korean case proved to be no 
exception. After land reform programs were implemented
in March and April of 1946, they were reported to have
<
secured the much needed peasant support for the regime
as well as making a favorable impression on the peasant
83 ufarmers in the American zone. Of course, the presence
of the Red Army helped to convince the North Korean land
owners to passively submit to the division of their
property. Although they were responsible for formulating
these reform policies, Soviet administrators preferred to
let the civilian government take full credit for their
formulation and implementation.
In order to secure control of the government, the 
Communists created a popular front coalition, known as the 
United Democratic National Front. Subject to the NKWP's
OQ
Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (Boston * Little, 
Brown, & Co., 1949), p. 95.
^McCune, Korea Today, p. 201.
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direct control, the Democratic Front aimed at capturing
the support of the more dissident political elements in
order to manufacture mass enthusiasm for the government's
policies. By late 1946, the Democratic Front claimed a
84membership m  excess of five million. Assured Of success 
at the polls, the Soviets decided to hold a general elec­
tion in November 1946 to gain a popular mandate to continue 
their programs. To no one's great surprise, the United 
Democratic National Front won a resounding victory.
Immediately after the election, the Interim People's 
Committee was called to convene in February 1947 to institute 
a permanent People's Assembly of North Korea. The NKWP had
the largest delegation, but their eighty-eight members were
85far short of a majority m  the new 237 member chamber.
The first session of the People's Assembly lasted only a 
few days and mainly concerned itself with the election of 
officers. Harmony in the new body was preserved by dis­
tributing the elected positions among the more powerful 
foreign factions. For example, Kim Tu-bong was chairman of 
the eleven member Presidium and Kim Il-sung headed the 
twenty-two man People's Committee.
®^For membership figure, ssee Rudolph, North Korea's 
Political and Economic Structure, p . 12.
85Ibid., p . 15.
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Realizing that their position in North Korea was 
more or less secure in that they controlled the party, 
army, and government —  the three pillars of power —  the 
Kremlin permitted the regime to advance toward nominal 
independence. Accordingly, Kim Tu-bong, as chairman of 
the Presidium, was instructed to present a draft of a pro- 
visional Korean constitution to the Assembly. Modeled 
after the 1936 Stalinist Constitution of the Soviet Union, 
the Korean document was subjected to much public discussion 
before it was enacted and finally promulgated on September 8, 
1 9 4 8 . ^  Elections were called under the constitution to 
fill the seats in the newly created Supreme People’s A s ­
sembly. Since the constitution was intended to constitute 
the basic law of both North and South Korea, the represen­
tation in the Assembly was proportioned between the two
87zones. Because the American occupation authorities
refused to recognize the validity of the 1948 constitution,
the delegates representing the South had to be indirectly
88
elected at a P ’yongyang convention. The Democratic Front
®^Tae-ho Kim, "The Ruling System of North Korean 
Regime," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 175.
87
Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang 
Government," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (1960), 382.
88Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic
Structure, p. 17.
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again won an easy victory, and as a result the Assembly 
asked Kim Il-sung to form a government.
Following the ratification of the constitution in 
September 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
proclaimed itself the legal government of all Korea. The 
newly independent state designated Seoul as its capital 
but for the time being was content to remain in its 
"temporary" quarters in P ’yongyang. However, its control 
in the north was assured by the legacy the Soviet occupa­
tion troops left after three years of strict domination 
and monopolistic power. Actually, "the Soviets," according 
to B. C. Koh, "succeeded in installing in the northern 
half of the Korean peninsula a political regime thoroughly 
subservient to their dictates and interests -- that is, 
a satellite.
The progress made in three short years in North Korea 
is even more impressive when compared to the two decades 
needed by Stalin to consolidate his power inside the Soviet 
Union. By 1948, Soviet influence was pervasive in North 
Korea, affecting not only the formal governmental structure 
but the country’s political and economic institutions as 
well. The success of the "sovietization" process was verified,
89K o h , The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p . 1.
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when the Russian Foreign Office delivered a note to the 
United States Embassy in Moscow on September 19, 1948 an­
nouncing the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Korean
90 !soil by the end of the year. The new Korean leaders,
and especially Kim Il-sung, were more than generous with
their praise for their friend and liberator, the U.S.S.R.
For instance, on September 21, 1948, Kim telegraphed Stalin
the following communique:
In strengthening in every way the friendship 
with the Soviet people and in the establish­
ment of stable political, economic, and cul­
tural relations with the Soviet Union, our 
people see the guarantee of their national 
independence, the guarantee of the state . . .
may the eternal and inviolable friendship 
of the people of the Soviet Union and Korea 
long endure and prosper! Long live Generalis­
simo Stalin -- the liberator and best friend 
of the Korean p e o p l e . ^
Therefore, as the last regiments of the Red Army returned 
home in December 1948, they left a technically "independent" 
state which actually remained totally subservient to the 
Soviet Union in every way. Indeed, this was quite an ac­
complishment; the Japanese tried to control Korea for
^^For a background on the Soviet troop withdrawal, see 
U.S., Department of State, Korea: 1945 to 1948. Far Eastern
Series 28, Pubn. 28 (October, 1948), pp. 114-15.
^ C i t e d  in John N. Washburn, "The Soviet Press Views 
North Korea," Pacific Affairs, XXII (March, 1949), 57.
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nearly four decades and never even approached such suc­
cess .
However, under this placid surface of" Russo-North 
Korean cooperation and friendship, there brewed a tempest 
of Korean nationalism. Even Kim Il-sung promoted nation­
alists objectives. As early as October 18, 1948, Kim 
said -
We must strengthen our unity so that we may 
build a new government with our own hands.
We must strive to become a completely demo­
cratic and independent nation which can stand 
on a footing of equality with our allies in 
the world. One of the most urgent tasks con­
fronting us today is the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of our national e c o n o m y . ^
This speech outlined the regime's course of action for 
the next two decades. Realizing that national pride was 
a prerequisite to the task of nation-building, Kim Il-sung 
appealed to the population's nationalist sentiments as he 
embarked on a full scale program of economic reconstruc­
tion. K i m ’s aim was to establish a self-identity for 
North Korea by achieving a self-reliant national economy 
and making the D.P.R.K. a nation worthy of international 
respect. In this way, he hoped to accomplish his ultimate
^2Cited in B.C. Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for 
Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (January-February, 
1969), 296.
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goal -- the ncommunization" of the entire Korean peninsula 
under the leadership of Korean hero, Kim Il-sung.
CHAPTER II
FROM SATELLITE TO INDEPENDENT STATE, 1948-1955
The months of November and December 1948 were domi­
nated by elaborately-staged farewell ceremonies for the 
departing Soviet Army of Occupation. As they left the 
newly '’sovietized” state of North Korea, Russian officers 
knew that the Kremlin need not fear that its influence 
over the northern half of the peninsula would disappear 
when the last Russian soldier crossed the border. The 
experts who had pushed for the troop withdrawal proved 
to have assessed correctly the situation for after in­
dependence, pro-Soviet propaganda and political education
1
campaigns became even more intensified.
Indeed, North Korean leaders constantly stressed the 
strengthening of ties with the U.S.S.R. On October 8,
1948, Kim Il-sung cabled Stalin to request the establish­
ment of diplomatic and economic relations between the two
*For example, in 1949, some 500 Koreans were reported 
to be studying inside the Soviet Union under a program 
proportedly designed to imbue Koreans with Stalinist doc­
trines and Russian culture. See U.S., Department of State, 
North Korea, p. 112.
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49
countries. Three days later Stalin enthusiastically replied
in the affirmative, stating that he was most ready "to
establish diplomatic relations . . . • and to exchange
ambassadors, and, together with this, to establish cor-
2
responding economic relations." The agreement was formalized 
quickly by an exchange of ambassadors. The first Soviet 
emissary, Colonel General Terentli F. Shtykov, was already a 
familar figure in P'yongyang since he formerly was the com- 
mander-in-chief of the Soviet occupation army.
Shtykov headed an immense Soviet Mission which of­
ficially replaced the old occupation organization but still 
carried on many of its activities. Located in P'yongyang, 
the mission consisted of the embassy proper, representatives 
of Soviet agencies active in Korea, special advisers, 
technicians, and managerial personnel. Direction for all 
Soviet activities was centered in the Embassy, and Ambassador 
Shtykov was responsible only to the Kremlin. The other 
sections of the mission each had their own special functions. 
For example, in order to further their economic interests 
in North Korea, the representatives of the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Trade headed a trade mission that had responsibility
^Washburn, "The Soviet Press Views North Korea," 
Pacific Affairs, XXII (1949), 57-58.
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for applying pressure on North Korean authorities to meet
3
export commitments to the U.S.S.R. Advisers and technical
personnel were reportedly dispersed throughout the entire
D.P.R.K. regime, including the Cabinet, National Planning
4
Commission, and Ministry of Defense. In fact, intelli­
gence information indicated that even Premier Kim Il-sung
5
received weekly instructions from the U.S.S.R. officials.
The continued all-pervasiveness of Soviet control led
C. L. Sulzberger to editorialize in 1949 that "Ambassador
Shtykov appears to be the true boss of the satellite state.
Just as in the occupation period, the Soviet Union
supervised developments within the North Korean regime by
using a small number of strategically placed personnel
inside the North Korean government and party apparatus.
Within the governmental apparatus alone, an estimated two
hundred critical positions were staffed by Soviet personnel
7
of Korean extraction. "Through a calculated policy,”
^U.S., Department of State, North K o r e a , p. 105.
4
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 42.
5Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktonq, North to the 
Yalu (Washington, D. C . : Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 7.
^Editorial, The New York Times, Jan. 18, 1949, p. 17.
7
U.S., Department of State, North K o rea, p. 101.
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according to a U.S. Department of State report, "the U.S.S.R.
infiltrated Soviet-Koreans into nearly all major government
agencies, usually in the position of vice-chairman, from
which position they were able to exercise power unobst.ru- 
8
sively. The nominal heads of North Korean ministries were
typically locally trained Communists; however, in most
cases they were outflanked in authority by Soviet-Korean
vice-ministers and high-ranking Soviet advisers. The
Soviets reinforced the chain of command from the Kremlin
to the North Korean ministries with various and sundry
political and psychological devices. These included formal
agreements, quasi-religious adherence to Marxism-Leninism,
monopolistic control of North Korea's foreign relations,
supervision of the education of future Korean leaders,
9
and outright MGB (Soviet Secret Police) surveillance.
North Korea was bound even closer to the Soviet Union 
by the joint economic and cultural ventures launched after 
1948. One of the more important agreements, signed on 
March 17, 1949, called for the contracting parties -- the
D.P.R.K. and the U.S.S.R. -- to facilitate the exchange of
^Ibid.
9
For general information on the controls employed, see 
ibid., pp. 103, 119. For the specific charge of the Soviet 
use of the MGB in North Korea, see ibid., p. 101.
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mutual experiences in industry and agriculture, to grant 
each other the right to reciprocal most-favored nation 
treatment in all matters relating to commerce, and to pro­
mote cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and the 
10
arts. In furthering their interests in North Korea,
Soviet officials took advantage of K o r e a ’s cultural lag 
and attempted to "sovietize" the population. For example, 
an increasing number of Koreans were compelled to study 
the Russian language; Russian literary works became standard
tests; and Russian movies, plays, dances and other art
. . .  . 1 1  .forms were given wide dissemination. Therefore, m
every way -- politically, economically, militarily, and
culturally —  North Korea was subservient to the Soviet
Union, making the D.P.R.K. "unquestionably" a Russian 
12
satellite.
By 1948, the pressure of South Korean authorities had 
become so intense that most SKWP activities were driven
^®For excerpts of the text of the U .S .S . R .-D . P . R .K. 
agreement on economic and cultural cooperation, see Donald 
G. Tewksbury, Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideolo­
gies , Source Books on Far Eastern Ideologies, Vol. II (New 
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), pp. 127-28.
^ U . S .  , Department of State, North K o r e a , p. 4.
^ C h o n g - s i k  Lee, "Stalinism in the East,” p. 129.
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underground. Their effectiveness being drastically curtailed 
by the police suppression, party stalwarts, like Chairman 
Pak Hon-yong, finally succumbed and fled north as most of 
the membership had previously done. After arriving in 
P fyongyang, Pak encountered a well-entrenched NKWP organi­
zation that did not view the recent SKWP invasion with 
much enthusiasm. Pak realized his own position was rapidly 
deteriorating since he was cut off from his power base in 
the South, and Kim Il-sung worried about the S K W P ’s po­
tential as a rival political faction if it remained outside 
his control. For these reasons, both parties welcomed the 
merger of the South Korean and North Korean Worker’s Parties. 
Formally Joined in June 1949, the new party was christened 
simply the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) and headed by none
other than Kim Il-sung, who was assisted by Vice-Chairman 
13
Pak Hon-yong.
Once established in P'yongyang, the South Korean 
Communists had established the United Democratic Father­
land Front which was designed to coordinate anti-American 
guerrilla activities in the South. The aims of the Father­
land Front were the following: (1) expulsion of American
troops and the United Nations Commission from South Korea,
^^Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, pp. 10-11.
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(2) achievement of Korean unification, (3) accomplishment 
of "democratic reforms" in a United Korea, and (4) coopera­
tion with the Soviet Union and Communist China in achieving 
14
these goals. Since Pak's position in the North Korean 
power structure greatly depended upon the kind of leader­
ship he could exert in the South, the apparent failure of 
the Fatherland Front caused him deep anxiety and profound 
apprehension. Therefore, In order to compensate for the 
Fr ont’s lack of success and to bolster his tenuous position 
in P'yongyang, Pak became one of the leading "hawks" advo­
cating unification by force.
Even before their "independence" in 1948, North 
Koreans had doggedly pursued their overriding objective 
of reunifying the peninsula. Of course, they won full 
Soviet approval since the Russians assumed that unification 
meant ’’communization" of the entire peninsula. Big power 
politics also conditioned Soviet support for North Korean 
reunification attempts. In 1945, Russia welcomed the 
United States as a mandatory power on its eastern flank 
with as much enthusiasm as the United States would have 
mustered in the event that the Soviets arrived in Latin 
America, or more specifically Mexico, as a mandatory power.
14Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang 
Government," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (1950), 389.
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While world politics greatly influenced the Soviet
stance on Korean unification, the North Korean position
was influenced by a messianic, nationalistic desire to
reunite their country. Indeed, in North Korean eyes, they
were merely pursuing a policy of manifest destiny in
struggling to communize the South. Although the strategy
periodically changed, North Korea originally hoped to build
a revolutionary base in the South which would serve not
only as a center for operations disruptive of the South
Korean government but also as a springboard toward the
eventual establishment of a Communist regime t h e r e . I n
quest of this objective, the North Koreans experimented
with various.tactics that ranged from peaceful persuasion
to armed invasion. In the pre-1948 period, for example,
demonstration, strikes and terrorism were employed; while
from 1948 to 1950, hostile activities were escalated when
the Democratic Fatherland Front began using guerrilla war- 
16f a r e .
Perhaps, it was inevitable that North Korea would be 
forced to resort to military means of unification. The
15B. C. Koh, MThe Pueblo Incident in Perspective,” 
Asian Survey, IX (April, 1969), 269.
^ P aige, "Korea,” p. 220.
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demonstrations, terrorist activities, and Fatherland Front
movement had led only to increased polarization of North
and South. In any event, North Korea began to formulate a
military strategy aimed at conquering the South very soon
17
after its liberation. The development of a modern, well- 
trained military establishment received top priority from 
the Soviet occupation officials. On February 8, 1948, the 
Korean People’s Army (KPA) was activated and readied to 
assume control after the Soviet withdrawal. In addition 
to the Soviets, the Communist Chinese assisted the develop­
ment of North Korea’s offensive potential by redeploying 
two Korean divisions of the People’s Liberation Army to
North Korea in July 1949 and by conveying Russian war materi-
18
als to P ’yongyang via the Manchurian railroads.
Just as they had penetrated the North Korean govern­
ment and party, the Russians infiltrated the Korean People’s 
Army with Soviet advisers and strategically placed Soviet- 
Korean officers. An estimated 3,000 Russians were involved
17 Yoon Chang Sun, former head of the Peace Preser­
vation Corps in P ’yongyang said that plans for the attack 
on South Korea were presented to North Korean security 
forces as early as September 1947. The New York Times,
Oct. 25, 1947, p. 1.
18Deok Kim, ’’Communist C h i n a ’s Intervention in the 
Korean War,’’ Korean Affairs. II, 2 (1963), 212-12,,
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19
in the KPA prior to June 1950. For the most part, they
served as military advisers, possess?lng various technical
and organizational skills lending themselves to special
projects; however, these Soviet officers were frequently
handicapped by their ignorance of Korean customs and the
language barrier. In the beginning, the KPA was top heavy
with advisory personnel; for example, there were as many
as 150 advisers per division, or almost one per company,
in 1948. Gradually, the number of advisers was scaled down
to more realistic proportions with twenty per division in
20
1949 and, finally, three to eight per division in 1950.
Besides offering technical assistance, the Soviet 
Union assumed the responsibility of arming the new Korean 
army. Cautiously, the KPA was supplied with weapons in 
well-defined stages: first, It was given captured Japanese
weapons; secondly, limited amounts of Russian equipment 
were introduced; and finally, heavy artillery, tanks, and 
trucks were supplied in the spring of 1950. Soviet material 
assistance gave the North Koreans the military muscle needed 
to launch an attack on the South. Although the Soviets
19Appleman, South to the Naktonq, North to the Y a l u ,
p. 7.
20
U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 114.
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claimed that only Russian material left in the wake of the
1948 evacuation was used in the Korean. War, markings on.
some of the captured North Korean equipment revealed its
21Soviet manufacture between 1949-1950. Even though they 
were striving on the one hand to develop a viable, inde­
pendent Korean fighting force, the Soviets kept close check 
of the reins in the other. For instance, gasoline was
22rationed to the North Korean air force on a monthly basis.
Furthermore, at this time, thousands of Koreans were 
learning the art of modern warfare from Soviet instructors. 
Locally, high Soviet officers were assigned to North Korea's 
two military academies and to the naval training school. 
However, conditions necessitated that most personnel, such 
as pilots, aircraft mechanics and automotive experts, be 
trained abroad in the Soviet Union. By 1950, the U.S.S.R. 
had succeeded in molding the KPA into a cohesive, modern 
fighting force while firmly implanting Soviet influence 
throughout its ranks.
Having been fully prepared for combat, the KPA took 
the world by surprise and suddenly invaded the South on 
June 25, 1950. Exactly why the Korean command launched
Appleman, South to the Naktonq, North to the Yalu,
p. 12.
^U.S. , Department of State, North Korea, p. 114.
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the offensive continues to be a matter of conjecture.
There are several factors that possibly could have in­
fluenced their decision. For one thing, Moscow, Peking
and P ’yongyang had every reason to expect an expeditious
23
and self-contained success from the venture. Likewise,
all three feared the post-war redevelopment of Japan, and
24
the rapprochement of Japanese and American policy. Then 
again, the events inside China may have had some effect in 
that, they could have created a revolutionary tide which 
swept over into Korea, causing emotions to rule over reason.
But more likely, there was an internal struggle in the KWP, 
touched off by the United Democratic Fatherland F r o n t ’s com­
plete failure in achieving unification that compelled the
25
North Korean leadership to adopt a more militant stance.
Whatever the cause, one thing is certain: the U.S.S.R., P.R.C.,
and D.P.R.K. all had a definite interest in excluding Ameri­
can influence from the mainland of Asia.
. James Reston commented that "the Russians were 
trying for a quick and easy victory in Korea and that they 
were not trying to get us off balance in order to start a 
maj'or all-out war." Editorial, The New York Times, July 23, 
1950, p. 23.
24
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 36.
Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North 
K orea,"p. 69.
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Considering the Soviet's position in the satellite
state of North Korea, it was inconceivable that the North
Korean regime reached the decision to invade independently
of the Kremlin. It was said that several Soviet general
officers and a number of field grade officers attached to
the Defense Ministry in P fyongyang possessed the authority
to review all decisions and check all information dealing
2 6with North Korean military affairs. Therefore, the war 
decision was, in all likelihood, made in Moscow or, at the 
very least, reluctantly approved by Kremlin officials. If 
the latter was the case, the Soviet Union had no real choice 
but to support the North Koreans (for the chauvinistic Korean 
Communists most certainly would have attempted an invasion 
sooner or later anyway) in order to preserve its position 
of influence.
Likewise, it was probably a Soviet tactic that ex­
cluded the Communist Chinese from the preliminary planning
27
stages of the war lest they become too influential. Evi­
dence indicated that the Chinese were, indeed, neglected; 
for example, no reports on the outbreak of hostilities in
^ U . S . ,  Department of State, North Korea, p. 113.
27For evidence of Communist Chinese exclusion, see 
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu. p. 45.
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Korea appeared in the Peking press until June 27, 1950 -- 
two days after the opening engagement, perhaps reflecting
C h i n a fs embarrassment on not being informed that an attack
28 ; 
was imminent. Undoubtedly, June 1950 marked the peak of
Soviet hegemony in North Korea, a position that would soon
decline as a result of the war's disastrous consequences.
At first, the decision to invade appeared to be well-
calculated and faultlessly executed as the North Korean
armies swept down the peninsula experiencing one success
after another. However, when the United Nations* forces
came to South Korea's assistance, the tide quickly turned
against the D.P.R.K. and its army was put on the defensive.
At this point, with the KPA in full retreat, the Kremlin
was confronted with a quickly deteriorating situation
that made the survival of their puppet regime in the North
highly questionable. The situation clearly called for
Soviet intervention but Stalin refused to be moved by
Kim Il-sung's pleas, preferring instead to avoid the risk
29
of a major war with the United States. Uoong Tack Kim 
asserted that TTin all likelihood, Stalin would have
28Deok Kim, "Communist China's Intervention in the 
Korean War," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 213.
^ C h o n g - s i k  Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 120.
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tolerated reluctantly, without military counteraction, a 
U.N.-sponsored American-South Korean conquest of North
Korea, as Khrushchev tolerated a capitulation in Cuba in
30 11962." Stalin’s decision not to intervene had two
important consequences: (1) China would become, by de­
fault, the power that rescued North Korea from the clutches 
of "western imperialism"; and (2) it raised grave doubts 
of whether or not the Soviet Union would "risk its neck" 
to defend other fraternal Socialist countries in the 
future.
Historically, the D.P.R.K. regime had enjoyed cautious
relations with the People’s Republic of China. In October
1949, Kim Il-sung had extended recognition to Mao Tse-tungTs
revolutionary regime, but it was not until August 1950
that Communist China finally dispatched an ambassador to
the North Korean capital. General Ni Chih-liang, Peking’s
first representative, became the second ranking diplomat
in P'yongyang; and on ceremonial occasions he was treated
with markedly less deference than was Soviet Ambassador 
31
Shtykov. After a few months of residence, Ambassador Ni
30Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North 
Korea, ’’ p . 81.
31
Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang 
Government," Pacific Affairs. XXIII (1950), 384-85.
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retired to China, leaving only a charge d ’affaires to repre-
32
sent Peking until 1955. Therefore, relations with main­
land China were cool at best in 1950, since both countries 
had failed to establish the usual channels of diplomatic
intercourse, to negotiate formal pacts, or to give fraternal 
33
assistance.
What motivated the P.R.C. to intervene in the Korean
War? First, it was highly unlikely that Stalin ordered the
Chinese initiative. Premier Stalin’s contempt for the
Chinese Communist leadership has been well-documented with
references to ’’margarine Communists,’’ ’’cabbage Communists,”
and ’’radish Communists;” the latter, specifically, in-
34
sinuating that they were red on the outside only. In
fact, Whiting tentatively concludes that Russian influence
was more of a contributing, rather than a determining, factor
in the Chinese decision and that Stalin, at most, gave his
35
reluctant assent to the move.
32
Whiting, China Crosses the Y a l u , p. 44.
^^Kim Il-sung had requested Chinese assistance as 
early as October 1950 but his pleas were rejected. Mao 
Tse-tung ordered the intervention only after the U.N. 
forces had approached the Sino-Korean border. See Roy 
U. T. Kim, ”Sino-North Korean Relations,” Asian Survey. 
VIII (August, 1968), 709.
34 / 'Herbert Feis, The China Triangle (New- York:
Atheneum, 1965), pp. 140-41.
35
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 153-160.
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Second, there were numerous strategic considerations 
that may have dictated the Communist Chinese decision.to 
openly ally themselves with the North Koreans. Deok Kim 
subscribes to this theory. He stated, "The Chinese Com­
munists were motivated in the decision primarily by their
own necessity and interest while Soviet prompting might
36
have existed." For mainland China, North Korea was a 
buffer state, separating it from a hostile Western world.
In geopolitics the Korean peninsula resembled the hilt of 
a dagger pointed into the heart of Manchuria. What as­
surance did the Communist Chinese have that the United 
Nations forces would stop at the Yalu River? The answer, 
of course, was none. Therefore, the leaders in Peking 
rightly feared that the United States and company, sparked 
by their initial success in conquering the peninsula, would 
invade Manchuria in an attempt to restore the Nationalist 
Chinese government. Furthermore, security-conscious Com­
munist China was concerned about Manchuria vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union in case North Korea fell into American hands. 
Possibly, the Soviets would use just such an event to 
j’ustify the installment of Russian troops on Manchurian
Deok Kim, "Communist China's Intervention in the 
Korean War," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 216-17.
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37
territory, a possibility almost as repugnant as an Ameri­
can attack.
In addition, some other lesser reasons may have
prompted Mao Tse-tung to enter the conflict. He believed
that open combat with a great power would enhance China's
international stature, while domestically it would help
consolidate power under the Communist regime by rallying
the population's nationalistic sentiments against an
external enemy. Mao also felt that the expulsion of the
"Western Imperialist" from their last stronghold on the
northeast Asian mainland would -facilitate the liberation 
38of Formosa. Furthermore, Chairman Mao may have been
repaying a debt to Premier Kim Il-sung in that, the latter
had sent some 10,000 Korean youths to fight in the final
39
stages of the Chinese Revolution. Even though the major 
considerations to intervene were most certainly based on 
security questions, these lesser reasons cannot be en­
tirely discounted.
37W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954), p. 69.
^^Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North 
Korea," p . 68.
on
Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and
the Party," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 109.
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The Communist Chinese intervention brought about some
significant changes in the relationship between the three
capitals -- Moscow, Peking, and P ’yongyang. For one thing,
Communist China gained a ’’relatively independent position”
40
in relation to the Soviet Union. However, the costs in­
volved were great; for example, Peking had been forced to 
borrow over $2 billion from Moscow to finance its war effort
in Korea -- a loan that took more than ten years to repay
41
at the high rate of interest the Soviets charged. Tempers 
between Moscow and Peking flared as Mao claimed it was
’’unreasonable for China to bear all the expenses /for the
—  42
Korean War/.”
Chinese intervention also resulted in mixed blessings
for Kim Il-sung’s regime. Chong-sik Lee explains:
It is reasonable'to assume that North Korean 
leaders were compelled to sacrifice their con­
trol of the war and to swallow their pride in 
accepting the Chinese "volunteers” who came 
to the rescue. Evidence suggests that the 
North Korean communists were not always in 
harmony with the Chinese, and one may suspect 
that the differences were rarely settled in 
favor of the Korean position .^
4(^ Deok Kim, "Communist C h i n a ’s Intervention in the 
Korean War,” Korean Affairs. II (1963), 201-21.
41 Allen Whiting, "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking 
Axis," Journal of Politics, XX (February, 1958), 13.
^"^Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 120.
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From the end of the Korean War onward. North Korea would 
experience a conflict in allegiance between its benefactor, 
the Soviet Union, and its preserver, the P e o p l e d  Republic 
of China.
In three years of fighting, the war reaped a heavy
toll of human suffering and mass destruction in North Korea.
After the first year alone, North Korean losses had exceeded
44
1,162,500 killed, wounded, or captured. A  North Korean
radio broadcast of May 28, 1954 announced that the country
had suffered more than a billion dollars worth of damage,
lost eighly-seven hundred industrial plants, and incurred
a drop in production to less than forty percent of the 
451949 level. Yet, North Korea's devastation maj/ not have
been the major factor that brought Kim Il-sung to the con­
ference table.
Kim Il-sung was under pressure from both proponents 
and opponents of the war. Domestically, the "hawkish"
South Korean faction, led by Pak Hon-yong, demanded a 
fight to the finish for reasons already discussed. Mean­
while, North Korea's two powerful allies pressed Kim's
44 The New York Times , June 2.3, 1951, p. 1.. .
45 ,
Shannon McCune, Korea's Heritage (Rutland,. V t . :
Charles and Tuttle, 1959), p. 123.
regime to accept the cease-fire agreement. By 1953, Com­
munist China was exhausted after almost twenty continuous 
years of fighting civil and foreign wars. No longer could 
Red China afford to wage war against the United States,
especially in the light of Truman's, and later Eisenhower's,
46 .
threats of a nuclear attack. Whereas, m  the Soviet
Union, the death of Stalin had left the huge Russian bear
without a trainer; thus, necessitating a temporary Soviet
withdrawal from world politics, while the succession question
was settled. Since it was totally dependent on foreign
support, the D.P.R.K. had little choice but to acquiesce
to demands for negotiations, a decision that was sweetened
with promises of post-war economic assistance from Moscow
and Peking.
After the Korean War, the Soviet Union suffered a 
noticeable loss of popular esteem among the North Koreans 
because of its failure to make a larger commitment to the
47
war effort when the D.P.R.K. was struggling to stay alive. 
Although the U.S.S.R. was not immediately dethroned from
^^SoOn Sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's 
Unification Policies, 1950-1965," World Politics. XIX 
(January, 1967), 221-22.
^^Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-war 
Politics of Communist Korea," China Quarterly, No, 14 
(1963), pp. 18-19.
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its paramount position of influence over North Korea,
Russia 5s war-time unpredictability did initiate a reaction 
that stressed independence and self-reliance. Soon, the 
regime instigated a policy designed to create a North 
Korean self-motif or self-identity (chuch T e ). Generally, 
c h u c h 1e could be described as a policy of self-reliance 
that adhered to the following tenets: (1) solve all
problems dealing with the revolution and the construction 
of Communism independently, in conformity'with local condi­
tions, (2) rely mainly on your own strength and oppose both
dogmatism and revisionism, (3) finding a solution to your
48
problems is strictly your own responsibility. C h uch1e 
put heavy emphasis on nationalistic symbols which were 
found to be highly effective in mobilizing the population 
for the rigors of post-war development. More will be said 
about this movement later when it went into high gear 
around 1955-1956.
Another side effect of the war was the reopening of 
party wounds and a post-war struggle for power. Kim Il-sung, 
already a proven political tactician as evidenced by the 
pre-Korean War purges, quickly began Machiavelli-like
^^Uoong Tack Kim, MSino-Soviet Dispute and North 
Korea," p . 331 .
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maneuvers to enhance his control over the KWP. As in the 
past, Kim employed the S.talinist tactics of formulating 
temporary alliances with his rivals for expediency. During 
the Korean War he openly attacked the members of the Y.enan 
faction. With the cooperation of Russian advisers, North 
Korean officers of Chinese Communist origin were removed 
from their commands and replaced with veterans of the 
anti-Japanese, partisan band of Kim Il-sung. As a means 
of illustration, one Yenan personality, General Mu Chong, 
was attacked for belonging to a suspect ’’Chinese clique”
49
and for bringing military disaster down upon North Korea.
After K i m ’s accusations of December 4, 1950, Mu Chong was 
stripped of his rank and sentenced to hard labor. Later, 
at the request of the Chinese Communists, he was transferred 
to China, where he died within a few months. Premier Kim 
was faced by two problems brought about by the war: (1) Chinese
Communist troops were on North Korean soil, and they might 
very well support a Yenan-inspired coup d ’etat against K i m ’s 
regime; and (2) a scapegoat had to be found to shoulder the 
blame for North Korea's war-time failure if Kim Il-sung him­
self was to escape the responsibility. ”Kim came to realize 
that the disaster of the war would inevitably be his own
4QSee, U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 115.
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responsibility," Roy Kim said in explaining the Yenan purge,
"and he probably hoped to protect himself against possible
replacement by a potential rival who enjoyed great popu-
50
larity with the Chinese Volunteers."
A second purge occurred at the Fourth Plenum of the
KWP in November 1951 . Because of increased resentment
over the Soviet Union fs failure to openly commit itself
to North K o r e a ’s defense, Kim Il-sung and the Yenan Koreans
coalesced to launch an attack on the Soviet-dominated KWP
appartus. K i m Ts prime target of criticism was the leader
of the Soviet-Korean faction and architect of the Korean
Communist Party, Ho K a i . Officially, Ho Kai was charged
with "formalism," "bureaucratism," and using a "closed-
51
door" policy in admitting new KWP members. Reportedly,
Ho Kai —  known for his pompous boasts -- blustered upon
52
being attacked, "Don’t you realize who Ho Kai is?"
Finally, under unbearable pressure, he committed suicide.
Then, in 1953, Kim Il-sung delivered a speech attack­
ing the "anti-party" clique which advocated the continuation
~*^Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,"
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 710.
51Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North 
Korea," pp. 89-90.
52Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier 
Kim," The New York Times Magazine. Feb. 25, 1968, p. 107.
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or the Korean War. Two days after the speech the regime
announced the arrests of twelve members of Pak Hon-yong’s
South Korean faction. During the war, the South Korean
Communists had infuriated Kim Il-sung by not providing
ample support to invading North Korean troops or promoting
a stronger insurgency movement in the South. Furthermore,
these "Left adventurists" —  as Kim Il-sung branded them -
were attempting to block the pending cease-fire agreement
54
so eagerly sought by North K o r e a ’s allies. Since they 
threatened to split the party over the issue of the cease­
fire, Kim Il-sung saw to it that a special military court 
charged the South Korean leadership with "treason against
the state" for allegedly plotting to overthrow Kim Il-sung
55
and install Pak Hon-yong as premier. Nine of the twelve 
received death sentences. Because of his tremendous popu­
larity, Pak Hon-yong escaped the 1953 purge. However, the 
North Korean government later disclosed that Pak was ex­
ecuted for treason and espionage in 1955.
The speech was delivered before the Central Committee 
of the KWP on August 5, 1953, while the defendants were actually 
arrested on July 30, 1953. See Cho, "The Politics of North 
Korean Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 220.
54Ibid, p. 221.
In the charges leveled against them, the defendants 
were called, somewhat inconsistently, "American spies." See 
ibid., p. 220.
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Needless to say, the successive purges greatly 
strengthened the position of Kim Il-sungfs partisan fac­
tion. However, Kim was still a long way from being omnipo­
tent. According to Chong-sik Lee, "divergence of opinion 
on policy matters was permitted among the top echelon
personel," a fact that indicated that "Kim Il-song may have
5 6been at the top, but he was not beyond challenge.”
Besides the purges, a massive membership drive was mounted
in an attempt to limit foreign, especially Soviet, influence
in the KWP. Between 1953 and 1956, the size of the KWP
57
membership almost doubled. The important implications 
in this increase of membership were that the new members 
were not subject to Soviet-controlled recruitment procedures 
or dependent upon Soviet favoritism for party promotions. 
Therefore, the more recent party recruits tended to support 
K i m ’s nationalistic chuch ’e campaign because they had no 
foreign allegiances.
In the immediate post-Korean War period, economic 
reconstruction received primary consideration from the 
North Korean regime. In April 1954, the government
Chong-sik Lee, ITKim Il-song of North Korea," Asian 
Survey. VII (1967), 379.
57Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier 
Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 107.
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promulgated a Three Year Plan -- which was actually a 
modification of Stalin’s early industrial policy —  de­
signed to restore 1949 production levels to most sectors
58
of the economy. Light industry and agriculture received
little stress, the major emphasis being reserved for the
development of vast capital construction. With an estimated
price tag of $321.2 million, North Korea could not possibly
undertake such an expensive and comprehensive project with-
. 59
out a vast amount of foreign financial assistance.
In September 1953, Kim Il-sung had personally headed 
a North Korean delegation to the U.S.S.R. in search of 
funds for his country’s redevelopment. After two weeks
of deliberations in Moscow, the Soviets finally agreed to
. . 60
contribute a $250 million grant for North Korean recovery.
In addition, Soviet officials promised that North K o rea’s
payments for previously advanced Soviet credit would be
61
substantially reduced. The Soviet aid was helpful, but
it was far from adequate to meet North K o r e a ’s needs.
5 8
Theodore Shabad, "North Korea’s Post War Recovery,"
Far Eastern Survey. XXV (June, 1956), 81-82.
~*^Yoon T. Ruark, "North Korea’s Industrial Development 
During the Post-War Period," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), 
p. 52.
^ Ibid. , p. 61.
1
Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea,"
p . 94 .
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Therefore, a similar mission was dispatched to Peking
two months later. As a result of their visit, Communist
China made its first venture into the foreign aid field
with a four-year grant of $324 million for Korea’s economic
62
rehabilitation. The grant was made payable in goods 
badly needed for the development of major industries; for 
example, the Chinese contributed building materials, com­
munications equipment, tools, etc. Also, Red China waived 
all claims and expenses against North Korea arising from 
the Korean War and promised to initiate a training program 
for North Korean workers and technicians. ’’This aid,”
Thomas An remarked, ’’was amazingly generous considering 
the major economic difficulties which beset mainland China,
and it was also better suited to the conditions and needs
—  —  63
of North Korea /than was Soviet aid/." Probably, the
Chinese funds came out of a massive loan it had previously
received from the Soviet Union; therefore, this sacrifice
showed the extraordinary importance Mao Tse-tung’s regime
64
placed on the North Korean recovery.
^ G l e n n  D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of 
Russian and Chinese Behavior," in Communist Strategies in A s i a , 
ed. by A. Doak Barnett (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 238.
63Thomas An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of 
Communism. XV (July-August, 1966), 70.
^ R o y  U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," 
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 710.
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The two large economic grants from Moscow and Peking
seem to have manifested a pattern of competition over the
allegiance of P'yongyang shortly after the conclusion of
the Korean War. Meanwhile, the smaller socialist republics
were also making a contribution to North Korea's economic
development. For example, East Germany gave 545.4 million
rubles, Poland donated 326 million rubles, Czechoslavakia
volunteered 113 million rubles, and poor Mongolia sacrificed
6,054 head of horses, 39,760 head of sheep, 18,693 head of
65
goats, and 446 head of dairy cows. During the immediate
post-war period, foreign assistance was absolutely vital;
as the figures show, foreign aid accounted for nearly a
66
quarter of North Korea's national income in 1954. Since 
this time, foreign economic aid gradually has declined as 
North Korea moved ahead on its program of self-sufficiency.
The influx of foreign capital enabled the North Korean 
economy to undergo a rapid metamorphosis after the Korean 
War. Among the changes that took place was the phasing out 
of the colonial-like trading agreements between the U.S.S.R. 
and the D.P.R.K. J. A. Kim reported, "all the pre-Korean
6 5
Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During 
the Post-War Period," China Q t l y ., No. 14 (1963), p. 61.
66Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic
Structure, p. 41.
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War trade was oriented toward the Soviet Union with raw
materials exported in 'exchange' for machinery and other
fl67
essential equipment. The Soviets, who had profited
immensely from this arrangement, attempted to forestall
trade reform and argued against the implementation of the
Three Year Plan in hopes of preserving the pre-Korean War
trading patterns. Later, the North Korean leadership charged
that "the U.S.S.R. used, or attempted to use, its economic
and military assistance as a lever to direct North Korean 
68
planning." Soon, trade agreements were concluded with
Communist China and other socialist republics as well as
69
with its former enemy, Japan. Thus, Kim Il-sung was 
thoroughly convinced that politics. 1 Independence could 
only be achieved with emancipation from Soviet economic 
domination, and he actively strove to diversify North 
Korea's trading relations.
In hopes of increasing food production, Kim Il-sung 
also made radical changes in the agricultural sector. Just
67Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in 
North Korea," Asian Survey, VI (May, 1965), 256.
T. Haggard, "North K o rea’s International Posi­
tions," Asian Survey, V (August, 1965), 380.
^ S e e ,  Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic,
p. 45.
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as Soviet troops had facilitated earlier land reforms, the
post-Korean War encampment of the Chinese Volunteers on
North Korean territory enabled the regime to institute rapid
collectivization policies. Cooperative farms were created
that closely paralled the Soviet 'collective’ farms in
organization. On each farm, the land, draft animals, and
major farm implements were owned jointly by the cooperative's
members, and the workers were paid for the number of days 
70
they worked. The rapid pace of collectivization is
evidenced by the following statistics: In 1953, only 0.6
per cent of the arable land and 1.2 per cent of the peasant
households were in cooperatives; in 1956, 77.9 per :cent of
the land and 80.9 per cent of the rural population were
collectivized; and by 1958, 100 per cent collectivization
71had been achxeved.
Simultaneously, the Three Year Plan began to have an 
impact on North Korea's war-damaged industrial base. Russian 
advisors had promoted more moderate proposals for industrial 
development but Kim Il-sung admonished against any relaxation
70
Chong-sik Lee, "The 'Socialist Revolution' in the 
North Korean Countryside," Asian Survey. II (October, 1962). 
lO.
71Rudolph, North Korea's Economic and Political
Structure, pp. 52-53.
of pressure. Premier Kim declared, "We must appeal to the
patriotic dedication of the masses to develop mass labor
mobilization in the effort to reconstruct the war-torn
industrial enterprises and the educational and cultural 
72
facilities." Just as in the agricultural sphere, the
industry was quickly transferred from private to state
hands. For example, revenues from socialist enterprises
steadily increased from 53 per cent in 1954 to 92.5 per cent 
73
in 1958. It was the hope of the North Korean economic 
experts that the stricter supervision and tighter organiza­
tion inherent in nationalization would result in greater 
economic mobility and higher levels of production, thus 
advancing the country on the road to self-reliance.
Although the North Korean regime stressed economic 
development to improve internal conditions in their country, 
they actually had a more overriding motive in mind —  Korean r 
unification. As B. C. Koh observed, "By raising the standard 
of living of the North Korean people, so the reasoning goes, 
economic growth can make North Korea both more tolerable 
to its own people and more attractive to the South Korean
72
Cited in Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East,"
p. 121.
73Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development 
During the Post-War Period," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 55
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people." Therefore, the goals of economic development, 
or creating a self-image, and communization of the Korean 
peninsula are deeply intertwined in North Korean strategy. 
North Korea, according to the master design, should form 
a solid revolutionary base that will guarantee the eventual 
takeover of the Republic of Korea in the south. But in 
order to build a revolutionary base, the D.P.R.K. must 
increase its national power, of which economic power is 
a crucial component.
Even though North Korea broadcasted appeals for a 
popular uprising in the South and sponsored mass strikes, 
boycotts, and sabotage in attempts to disrupt the South 
Korean regime, it generally followed a policy of "peace­
ful" unification in the post-Korean War years. At the Sixth 
Assembly of the KWP's Central Committee in August 1953, 
the membership passed a declaration stating, "The unifica­
tion of our Motherland must be achieved only by peaceful
75
means without foreign intervention." The policy was 
founded on a massive psychological campaign which continually 
bombarded South Korea with various proposals for unification.
Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 265-66.
^ C h o ,  "The Politics of North Korea's Unification 
Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 220.
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The North Koreans used ,fthe tactics of invidious comparison 
(in which the North is portrayed as heaven and the South 
as hell) and the tactics of anti-foreignism (in which the 
American involvement in Korea has been depicted in the most
*7
barbarous terms)1’ in the psychological war. In addition, 
the North offerred to send relief to the starving, the un­
employed, and the orphaned of South Korea. Finally, the 
D.P.R.K. would periodically offer a unification formula,
such as free all-Korean elections under the supervision
77 • .
of neutral powers. However, as time passed without
yielding any concrete results, the peaceful psychological 
offensive gradually became overshadowed by subversive 
activities aimed at the South Korean government.
Invigorating North K o r e a ’s drive toward economic 
development and unification was the regime’s constant 
invocation of national symbols. Chong-sik Lee has re­
marked that ’’the outstanding characteristic of the post-
Korean War policies of the P'yongyang regime was the emphasis
78
on nationalism.” Most commonly, nationalism glorified 
7 £\
Paige and Lee, ’’The Post-war Politics of Communist 
Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 27.
^ C h o ,  "The Politics of North K o r e a ’s Unification 
Policies,” World Politics. XIX (1967), 218-219.
^^Chong-sik Lee, ’’Stalinism in the East,” p. 119.
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the country’s pre-colonial past and resurrected the native 
culture. Noticeable attention was focused on Kim Il-sung's 
struggle against the Japanese, for instance. Premier Kim 
repeatedly criticized the excessive adulation of the Soviet 
Union that remained from the occupation and pre-war satel­
lite period. For example, he attacked the hanging of 
pictures of Siberian fields in army recuperation centers, 
charts of the U.S.S.R.’s Five Year Plan in the "democratic 
propaganda rooms," photographs of "factories of foreign
nations" in Korean plants, and the lack of Korean h e r o ’s
79portraits m  schools. Nationalist themes were also 
employed in North Korean efforts to unify the peninsula 
under their aegis.
More and more, Kim Il-sung’s rhetoric alluded to 
the implementation of a chuch1e policy. He stressed that 
Korea should become the master of its own destiny and that 
political independence was meaningless unless it was under­
grided by economic independence. The term "chuch’e " was 
first publicly uttered by Premier Kim in a speech to a 
group of propaganda and agitation workers of the KWP on 
December 28, 1955. In that address Kim said, "The primary 
motivation for studying the histories of the Communist Party
79Ibid., p. 124.
of the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Revolution, or the principles
of Marxism-Leninism, is to apply them for the implementation
80of Korean revolution.” In insisting that North Korea
work toward autonomy, then, Kim Il-sung was denying the
value of learning from other countries. He continued:
We must learn from all the Socialist countries, 
particularly from the Soviet Union. The important 
thing is to know the purpose of our learning. . .
According to Kim, the experiences of other fraternal Com­
munist nations can aid the revolutionary development of 
North Korea but should not necessarily direct, in an abso­
lute sense, the regime's course of action. Kim concluded 
his 1955 speech with the statement: "We must learn our
own national history, the history of the struggle of our 
people, and propagate this into the minds of our workers . .
The 1955 C h u c h 1e Speech pointed up the drastic changes 
that had taken place in the decade since North Korean liber­
ation. No longer a Soviet satellite, indiscriminately
80  ‘
Cited in Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations, 
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 711.
81
Cited in B. C. Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for 
Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII, 3 and 4 (1965-1966),
295.
82Cited in Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and 
the Course of North Korea,” Koreana Quarterly. V (Summer, 
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ratifying the Kremlin’s policies, the D.P.R.K. now earnestly
pursued the creation of a viable self-image. The methods
employed in seeking this goal were immaterial to Kim Il-
sung ’s regime. All that mattered was the end result. As
Premier Kim said, ”It makes no difference whether we eat
our food with the right or the left hand, with a spoon or 
83
chopsticks. ”
Conditions stemming from the Korean War dictated 
that North Korea adopt a more independent stance in its 
relations with other Communist states. For one thing, 
the D.P.R.K. had to rely on economic assistance from all 
the socialist republics in the years immediately following 
the Korean Conflict to ensure its survival. For another, 
the lack of Soviet wartime support left the North Koreans 
highly suspicious of future Soviet commitments and desirous 
of an independent security force. Therefore, the Soviet 
Union could never return to the position of hegemony it 
enjoyed from 1945 to 1950. In 1955, Kim Il-sung asked
’’have we not now reached the point where we can construct
t- —  84
our own way /to socialism/?” This query was an excellent
83Cited in Koh, ’’North Korea and Its Quest for 
Autonomy,” Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 295.
84Cited in Paige and Lee, ’’The Post-war Politics of 
Communist Korea,” China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 24.
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indication of what had happened since the war and of what 
could be expected from the regime in the future as it labored 
toward the goal of constructing a self-motif in hopes of 
achieving reunification under the direction of Kim Il-sung.
CHAPTER III 
THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS AND 
THE PERIOD OF EXPERIMENTATION, 1956-1961
By the mid-1950s, North Korea was well on the road 
to economic recovery; its foreign policy was cautiously 
emerging into the light of independence; and, as usual, 
the regime had moved no closer to achieving its paramount 
goal of unification. However, a rift was to develop shortly 
between the Soviet Union and Communist China that would have 
wide-spread implications for the Communist world and affect 
the behavior of every member state of the Communist bloc, 
including the D.P.R.K. Although the full extent of the 
Sino-Soviet dispute was not officially known outside of 
Communist circles until 1960, the first evidence of the con­
flict became visible at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU 
held in Moscow from the 14th to the 20th of February 1956.^
^For general reference, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
The Soviet Bloc (New York: Viking Press, 1966), David
Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1964);
G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, 
The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1962); and
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).
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At the congress, CPSU Chairman Nikita Khrushchev in­
troduced three major doctrinal innovations, specifically:
(1) peaceful coexistence with the West, (2) a multiplicity 
of forms of socialist development, and (3) rej'ection of the 
cult of the individual. These three doctrinal pronounce­
ments have since caused numerous ideological disagreements 
over global strategy, intra-bloc relations, de-Stalinization, 
permissibility in constructing socialism, and bloc leader­
ship between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R.^
With regard to Russian foreign policy and the strategy 
of global revolution, Chairman Khrushchev outlined three 
new axioms of international conduct at the Twentieth Party 
Congress. First, he declared that peaceful coexistence, 
and not military confrontation, was a "fundamental principle"
of Soviet foreign policy because of "our certainty" of
3
a Communist victory in peaceful competition. Stressing 
that there was no longer a practical alternative to peace­
ful coexistence in the thermal-nuclear age, the Soviet 
leader claimed,
There are only two w a y s : either peaceful
coexistence or the most destructive war in 
history. There is no third way.
2Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 40.
^Ibid .
4Cited in Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p. 228.
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Khrushchev made it clear that in proposing a detente 
between East and West he was acting as the spokesman for 
the entire Communist world,for peaceful coexistence was 
not solely a "principle of Soviet foreign policy" but 
"one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of the 
Chinese People's Republic and the other people's democrat’ 
cies."^ Indeed, this turned out to be news for some Com­
munist leaders.
Second, Marxist-Leninist dogma which preached that
wars were inevitable as long as capitalism existed was
modified to conform to the policy of peaceful coexistence.
Therefore, wars no longer remained a "fatalistic inevita- 
6
bility" because the Soviet Union had risen to great power 
status, thus giving the socialist camp the formidable means 
to deter any imperialist attempt at aggression. Lastly, 
Khrushchev foresaw the possibility of a non-violent trans­
formation from capitalism to socialism in most countries.
Ever since the death of Stalin, the U.S.S.R. had 
been plagued with the problem of re-establishing a viable 
pattern of intra-bloc relations. StalinTs passing had 
sounded the death knell for Stalinist techniques of control
^Ibid.
^Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 40.
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over the Communist world. No longer could the socialist 
camp be ruled as a personal empire; therefore, a new re­
lationship that insured unity, yet allowed diversity, 
somehow had to be constructed. Hoping to have discovered 
the middle course, Chairman Khrushchev endorsed the diverse 
forms of socialist development by citing China's "creative 
Marxism in action" and Yugoslavia's "specific forms of 
economic management and organization of the state apparatus" 
as excellent examples of "much that is unique in socialist 
construction." A few months after the congress, Khrushchev 
finally committed himself to "a multiplicity of forms of
social development" in an attempt to woo freethinker Tito
8
back into the Soviet fold.
However, the Kremlin continued to formulate its 
policy toward other fraternal Communist states as if the 
old monolithic, Stalinist structure still existed. Evidently, 
Soviet leaders hoped that words alone would satisfy demands 
for greater Russian tolerance of diversity. Meanwhile, 
Communist China and the other more restless Communist states 
kept proposing a flexible, federal approach based on equality 
and mutual respect as a new foundation for the Communist
7
Cited in ibid., p. 50. 
^Ibid.
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camp. Kremlin leaders remained unmoved until the tragic
events of the Hungarian and Polish uprisings convinced
them that their words had opened the way tor proponents
ot greater equality and diversity and that it was already
too late to revert back to the days ot Stalin. As the
Italian Communist Palmiro Togliatti observed, in enunciating
9
his tamous locution ''polycentrism”, independent autonomy
in the Communist community indeed had replaced the tormer,
Soviet-controlled monolithic bloc.
However, the most signiticant pronouncements at the
1956 Congress were made in secret sessions, in which
Khrushchev exploded in a violent tirade against methods ot
lO
leadership employed by the late Premier Stalin. Sub­
sequently, Khrushchev's denunciation ot Stalin led the
congress to adopt a resolution censuring "the cult of the 
11
individual." Of all the doctrinal reforms, the rejection 
of Stalinism, or the cult of personality, had the greatest 
impact on the Communist world.
9
Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, Polycentrism 
(New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 127.
^ F o r  Khrushchev's secret speech of February 24, 1956, 
see Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies, II (New York: 
Praeger, 1957), pp. 172-188.
Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p. 231.
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So far as we know, Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin 
came as a complete surprise to the other Communist leaders 
in attendance. It probably was shocking to many of them 
and may have seriously undermined Soviet influence. In 
many socialist countries, Communist China and North Korea 
among them, Stalin had been enshired as a demigod and the 
political leaders religiously adhered to and relied upon 
his methods of control. Moreover, a fear was aroused in 
Peking that the Russian leader's attack on the cult of 
Stalin actually might have been intended for Chairman 
M a o .
Regardless of the hostile reception Khrushchev's 
doctrinal pronouncements received in Red China, the D.P.R.K.*s 
initial reaction was cautious and non-committal. Choe 
Yong-kun, North Korea's chief delegate to the Twentieth 
Party Congress, simply avoided the more controversial issues 
and fully endorsed the Soviet position when his turn came 
to address the congress. At home, the North Korean press 
gave favorable comment to Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations 
in their editorials but, at the same time, were careful to 
omit any details of the de-Stalinization campaign except 
for the congress' resolution on the cult of personality. 
However, the KWP organs enthusiastically lauded the 20th 
Congress for creatively applying the principles of Marxism-
92
Leninism ,rby recognizing that the transition to socialism
would have various forms according to different backgrounds
—  —  12
and conditions /of the countries involved/." Very often,
excerpts from Kim Il-sungfs 1955 C h u c h *e Speech were cited 
in conjunction with KhrushchevTs remarks on the numerous 
paths that led to socialist development.
Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung could not ignore the implica­
tions that Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist campaign might have 
on his own position of authority. Purely as a precautionary 
measure against possible accusations that Kim was promoting 
a cult of personality, the KWP newspaper, Nodong Sinmun, 
reported:
The collective principle in party leadership 
is of enormous practical significance. The 
Central Committee of our Party, mindful of 
Comrade Kim Il-songrs repeated emphasis on 
the matter, has therefore spared no effort 
to strictly observe the Leninist principle 
of collective leadership, to encourage intra­
party democracy, criticism, and self-criticism,^ 
and to further strengthen ties with the masses.
Yet, Kim could not isolate himself from the repercussions
of the de-Stalinization movement in the Soviet Union.
Kim Il-sung was especially vulnerable to charges of
^2Cited in Roy U, T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Rela­
tions, ft Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 712.
13Cited in Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 47.
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sanctioning a personality cult because "for North Korea
this /was/ a Stalinist age, and Kim /was/ the all-conquering,
14all-wise hero to whom everyone must pay homage." During
this period, signs of Stalinism were very much in evidence;
for example, huge portraits of Kim hung in front of public
buildings and gigantic characters proclaiming MLong Live
Marshall Kim Il-s5ng" were perched on top of prominent 
15
buildings. A more unobtrusive illustration was the
firing of a high official from his party post because he
referred to Kim Il-sung as tonqmu (the ordinary word for
16
"comrade” ) instead of t 1onqji (the honorific form).
Still, the Kim Il-sung clique made some weak attempts at
correcting the situation. For instance, when the Third
Congress of the KWP convened in April 1956, pictures of
Kim Il-sung were conspicuously absent from the convention
hall —  "an obvious sign that the KWP leadership was anxious
17to avoid any manifestation of the cult of Kim Il-song."
Yet in spite of all their precautions, Kim Il-sung
Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North 
Korea," China Quarterly. No. 14 (1963), p. 34.
' ^^Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 119.
16Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist 
Korea," China Qtly. , No. 14 (1963), p. 29.
^Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 48.
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was faced with the first, and only, serious challenge to
his power position in August 1956. While the premier was
making a two month "good w i l l ” tour of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, a cabal of Soviet and Yenan Koreans
was organized in the party's hierarchy. The leaders of the
secret movement, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, a vice-premier and chief
theoretician of the Yenan faction, and his counterpart from
the Soviet faction, Pak Ch'ang-ok, jointly authored a series
of articles suggesting that the KWP was guilty of forming
a personality cult around their chairman, Kim Il-sung.
Upon his return, Kim came under fire at the August Plenum
of the KWP Central Committee from this rebellious Soviet-
Yenan coalition which accused him of seeking to perpetuate
a personality cult of his own, of violating the principle
of collective leadership, and of enforcing stringent economic 
. . 18
policies. Not content with mere verbal attacks, Pak 
Ch'ang-ok took it upon himself to write to Premier Khrush­
chev and complain that the CPSU pronouncement on collective 
leadership had teen ignored in North Korea. However, the 
revolt was shortlived since the anti-Kim faction failed to
1 8
B. C. Koh, "North Korea: A Profile of a Garrison
State," Problems of Communism. XVIII (January-February, 1969), 
20.
Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist
Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 23.
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I
attract many recruits and, therefore, remained badly out­
numbered by the premier’s supporters.
As could be expected,a wholesale purge was quickly 
implemented in the wake of the anti-Stalinists* defeat.
Very likely a horrible blood bath would have resulted had 
not the Soviet Union and Red China decided to intervene. 
Apparently, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan 
and Chinese Communist Marshall P ’eng Teh-huai secretly 
flew from their respective capitals to P'yongyang to act 
as an international Communist court of appeal. Both repre­
sentatives urged moderation and suggested the reinstatement
of the anti-Kim faction in the KWP as loyal critics of 
20
Party policy. Although most of their proposals were 
ignored, Mikoyan and P ’eng did manage to temper the purges’ 
effect by giving many of the Soviet and Yenan victims time 
to escape to their respective homelands. Most certainly, the 
events of August 1956 did not help to endear Khrushchev to 
Kim Il-sung. Almost immediately, Premier Kim responded 
to the Soviet intervention by intensifying his nationalistic 
policy and by asserting his country’s independence within 
the Communist camp. More importantly, the absence of the 
purged Soviet-Korean faction’s traditional moderating
20
Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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influence was felt as the KWP shifted to the left on
ideological and economic issues, roughly paralleling the
21
moves made by the Communist Party of China.
As a postscript, the efforts at de-Stalinization were
%
only temporary in North Korea. Most of the attacks on
Stalinist practices were engineered merely to please the
Soviet Union and to assure the Kremlin that the Kim Il-sung
regime was actively eliminating the evils of Stalinism.
Since P ’yongyang refrained from attacking Stalin personally,
the D.P.R.K.Ts anti-Stalinist campaign also met with complete
22
P.R.C. approval. Once Soviet pressure had diminished,
K i m fs personality cult quickly rose to the surface again.
For example, in the interest of "history," the North Korean
regime created numerous revolutionary (i.e., pre-1945)
"shrines"- to glorify the past achievements of the supreme 
23
leader. Slogans, such as "Let’s study from the leader’s 
life" and "Glory of the Kim Il-song anti-Japanese guerrillas," 
were promoted in the aftermath of the de-Stalinization campaign.
21 Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, "The Russian Faction in 
North Korea," Asian Survey, VIII (April, 1968), 287-88.
22
Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 130.
23
Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 49.
24
Sohn, "Factionalism and Party Control of the 
Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana Quarterly,
IX (1967),25.
In November 1961, Kim Il-sung buried the question of
Stalinism once and for all by stating, "The problem of
Stalin and anti-party factions in the CPSU has nothing to
do with our Party and cannot be the subject of discussion
25
by or in our Party."
In 1957, the rift between the Soviet Union and Com­
munist China was further widened by problems arising from 
arms sharing agreements and Soviet superiority in the field 
of space. Toward the end of the year, the twelve ruling 
Communist parties gathered in Moscow as part of the 
fortieth anniversary celebration of the October Revolution. 
Their meeting —  the 1957 Moscow Conference as it came to 
be called —  resulted in a declaration that stressed the 
need for bloc unity and solidarity and that condemned
"modern revisionism" -- an obvious slap at defiant Yugo- 
26
slavia.
Throughout the conference, North K o r e a ’s chief delegate, 
Kim Il-sung, seems to have supported Mao Tse-tung’s centralist 
position which placed more emphasis on national autonomy. 
However, this should not be misinterpreted as P ’yongyang’s
Cited in Haggard, "North Korea’s International 
Position," Asian Survey. V (1965), 380.
Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 53.
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blind endorsement of Peking over Moscow. Actually, Kim
was hoping to maintain a middle-of-the-road policy between
the two Communist giants by recognizing the Soviet Union's
fundamental role in the international Communist movement
while simultaneously emphasizing that intra-bloc relations
should be based on "principles of complete equality, respect
for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty,
28
and non-interference in one another's affairs."
Yet, the pleas of unity issued by the 1957 Moscow
Conference were soon drowned out by the intra-bloc discord
raised over the "revisionist" Communist state of Yugoslavia.
Khrushchev’s original pronouncements on the multi­
plicity of forms of socialist development and bloc equality 
were aimed at achieving an ideological rapprochement with 
Tito. In the summer of 1956, North Korea reacted favorably 
to the readmission of Yugoslavia into the Socialist camp 
by hailing the rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade 
as a "positive contribution" to the easing of world ten­
sions and to the restoration of an atmosphere of confidence
29
essential to harmonious international relations. But
^^See Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," 
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 712-15.
28Ibid., p. 713.
PQ
Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 53.
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even though they fully endorsed the doctrine that there 
were a variety of ways of building socialism depending upon 
the historic circumstances found in each case, the North 
Koreans did not believe that a Communist state like Yugo­
slavia could'deviate from the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
at will. After the 1958 attacks on Ti t o ’s "modern revi­
sionism" by Prayda (Moscow) and Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking),
the North Korean press began printing mild criticisms of
30
the Yugoslav regime. Then urged on by the Khrushchev-Mao
statement of August 3, 1958 on Tito’s tactics, the North
Koreans blasted the "dirty Yugoslav revisionists" and
announced their determination to "wage an uncompromising
31
struggle" against Yugoslavian revisionism.
Although the events happening within the Communist 
world were the prime topics of conversation in many Com­
munist-controlled capitals, North Koreans generally tended 
to be more parochial and ignore the almost daily developments 
in the dispute. Almost all their attention was taken up
by the domestic scene, for 1956 marked North K o r e a ’s official
32
entry into the period of socialist construction. For
•^Ibid. , p . 55 .
31T K . ,Ibid.
32"Rudolph, North Korea’s Political and Economic
Structure, p. 56.
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example, at the KWP's Third Congress in April 1956, future 
economic policies, and not the Twentieth Party Congress of 
the CPSU, was the major topic of discussion. Always looking 
ahead, Kim Il-sung wanted to use the Five Year Economic 
Plan he introduced at the KWP Congress as the cornerstone 
of an independent, self-reliant national economy. Un­
doubtedly, he relied on his revolutionary base argument as
a means of justification for the continued emphasis on
33
heavy industry in this plan. But in order to ensure the 
viability of the domestic base, North Korea had set very 
ambitious goals for collectivization and industrialization 
under the Five Year Plan (1957-1961); in reality, they 
were close to impossible targets that could only be achieved 
by bold innovation and experimentation.
Two additional factors -- the evacuation of the 
Chinese Volunteers and the 1958 Yenan purge -- also caused 
North Koreans to orientate their attention inward. A p ­
parently, the stationing of Chinese troops inside Korea 
had become too great a burden, both politically and economically, 
for Kim Il-sung’s regime. Ever since 1956, the North Korean 
premie^ ’s calls for unification had included a demand for
33Cho, "The Politics of North K o rea’s Unification 
Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 227.
lOl
34the withdrawal of Chinese and American forces from Korea.
On February 5, 1958, Radio P'yongyang broadcasted a detailed
proposal to the United Nations ’ forces for the withdrawal
of the "U.S. Army and all other foreign troops including
35
the Chinese People’s Volunteers." The Chinese responded
on February 7th that "in order to break the deadlock on the
Korean question" they were prepared to evacuate the penin- 
36
sula. Roy Kim believes that "P'yongyang made the initial
February 5 request for the complete withdrawal of foreign
troops on its own initiative, possibly with the advance
37
understanding of the Kremlin in 1956."
On February 14, Premier Chou En-lai and a small Chinese
delegation made an unannounced sojourn to P ’yongyang. Upon
arriving at the P ’yongyang Airport, Chou En-lai not only
reaffirmed the "ever-lasting" Sino-Korean friendship, but
appealed to North Korea's national pride by expressing
C h i n a ’s eagerness to "learn" from North Korea's experience
38
in socialist construction. A week later, a j'oint Chinese-
34 Ibid., pp. 228-29.
^5Cited in Carl Berger, The Korean Knot (Rev. Ed.; 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 220.
36
Cited in ibid.
3^Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,"
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 716.
38Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 53.
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Korean communique revealed that the Chinese intended to
39
completely evacuate by the end of 1958.
Even though the U.N. forces failed to reciprocate 
and withdraw from their positions in the South, the Chinese 
Volunteer Corp departed from North Korea as planned. In 
retrospect, the presence of the Volunteer Corp had been a 
mixed blessing for North Korea. On one hand, they had 
provided a significant portion of the badly needed man­
power for the post-war rehabilitation programs and had 
rescued the North Koreans from military collapse; while 
on the other, the regime could never achieve an independent 
self-motif with foreign troops camped on its soil. Moreover, 
the Chinese presence represented a direct threat to Kim 
Il-sung’s leadership position within the regime. The 
Chinese withdrawal of some 30,000 troops definitely weakened
North K o rea’s military position in respect to South Korea,
40
for the latter now had twice as many men under arms.
Still, many of these same Chinese regiments were immediately 
redeployed along the Sino-Korean frontier, where they could 
readily serve as reinforcements in the event of future con­
flict on the peninsula.
39 Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,”
Asian Survey. VIII (1968), 715.
40
A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New 
York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 119.
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As soon as their protective shield —  the Chinese 
Volunteer Corp -- had been weakened, Kim Il-sung initiated 
a purge against the Yenan leadership which had been active 
in the 1956 anti-Kim movement. Kim Tu-bong, still the head 
of” the Yenan faction, was accused of divisive activities, 
nepotism, and corrupting the young cadres of the Party; 
and he was expelled from the KWP in March 1958, along with 
Ch'oe C h rang-ik (prime Yenan leader in the 1956 attack on
X 41Kim Il-sung). In a last ditch effort to retain power,
the Yenan Koreans plotted a coup a *etat to have General 
Chang P ’yong-san, a veteran of the Eighth Route Army, re­
move Kim Il-sung from office on May Day 1958. However, the
plan was prematurely exposed, and the Yenan faction was
42
summarily swept from the North Korean political arena.
Against this backdrop of external and domestic 
vicissitude, the North Korean regime embarked on a policy of 
experimentation in hopes of speeding the process of economic 
development. Already by 1958-1959, North Korea had made 
such giant strides toward industrialization that it was
^ C h o ,  "The Politics of North Korea's Unification 
Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 228.
42Sohn, "Factionalism and Party Control of the 
Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana Qtly. ,.IX 
(1967), 23.
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now a predominantly industrial nation. In addition, the
collectivization of agriculture was completed at this time. 
With these accomplishments under its belt and a rapidly 
declining dependence on foreign assistance, North Korea 
was more in a position to choose its own policies. Al­
though P ’yongyang had been more responsive to Peking since 
the Korean War, it was not until late 1958, and the Korean 
experimentation with Chinese agricultural communes, that 
Soviet hegemony was seriously challenged.
Numerous explanations for the 1958-1961 period of 
experimentation with Communist Chinese policies have been 
offered, but most center on the close parallels between 
D.P.R.K. and P.R.C. experiences in development. For both 
economic development has been a critical factor. Koh 
observed that "although they have had varying degrees of 
success in their campaigns to wipe out poverty and to
stand on their own feet, they still remain in the ranks
44
of the ’have n o t ’ nations." Moreover, North Korea’s 
pattern of socialization resembled the Red Chinese model 
rather than those of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.
43Koh, ” North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy,"
Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 302.
^ K o h , The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p . 62.
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In fact, the timing and tempo of Pyongyang's collectiviza-
45tion effort coincided exactly with C h i n a ’s. In addition,
Rudolph commented, "The fervor of the ideological campaigns,
the extensive use of mass organizations in the regimentation
and mobilization of the population, and the current drive
to hasten the building of socialism /in the D.P.R.K^/ also
exhibit much of the same intensive character as the Chinese
, 46
effort to transform the country.”
In their common pursuit of economic development, China
and North Korea came into direct conflict with many of the
Kremlin’s policies. As has been previously mentioned, Kim
Il-sung and Mao Tse-tung continued to perpetuate their
personality cults, which ran counter to the Soviet de-
Stalinization campaign. For another thing, Russian leaders
were becoming more preoccupied with meeting the increasing
demands for consumer goods in the Soviet Union and, thus,
more divorced from the rigid controls needed by the Koreans and
47
the Chinese to implement the socialist economic structure.
^^Yoon T. Kuark, "North K o r e a ’s Agricultural Develop­
ment During the Post-War Period," China Quarterly, No. 14 
(1963), pp. 82-93.
46Rudolph, North K o r e a ’s Political and Economic 
Structure, p. 62.
47 Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course 
of North Korea," Koreana Quarterly, V (Summer, 1963), 54.
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And finally, the P.R.C. and D.P.R.K. engendered a constant
mode of hatred against the "U.S. imperialists" and nurtured
a bellicose spirit in an effort to spur its population to
continually excel previous production records. Therefore,
Kim Il-sung was profoundly dissatisfied with Khrushchev's
overtures to the United States for regularizing relations;
and, furthermore, he regarded the United States "as the
major enemy blocking attainment of /his_/ primary goals --
the destruction of the anti-Communist regime in South Korea
and the reunification of the whole country under Communist 
48
domination." Likewise, American military presence was
preventing Chairman Mao's absorption of Taiwan.
Furthermore, Khrushchev's practice of meddling in
intra-party affairs of other Communist states produced a
nationalistic reaction to what the North Koreans and the
Chinese Communists called Soviet "big-power chauvinism."
Griffith believes, "Khrushchev probably attempted to bully
49
Kim into line as he did Mao, Hoxha, and others. • Also, 
Kun has pointed out that "in the example of Khrushchev's 
roughness toward smaller Communist parties such as the
48An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, 
X V - (1966), 69.
^ W i l l i a m  E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relati.ons, 1964- 
1965." China Quarterly. No. 25 (1966), p. 77.
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Albanian, the North Korean leadership saw a potential menace
5°
to the independence of the Korea Worker's Party. There­
fore, the Kremlin's well-intended moves to bring greater 
inter-party discipline by interferring in intra-party . 
affairs actually had the reverse effect in that, Kim Il-sung 
and other Communist leaders responded by avowing an even 
more independent line.
Although so many Soviet policies conflicted with 
North Korean goals, Kim Il-sungTs regime still could not 
afford to completely alienate the Russians. Therefore, 
throughout the period of experimentation, North Korea's 
relationship with the Soviet Union remained essentially 
intact. The regime continued to pay homage to the U.S.S.R. 
as the leader of the socialist camp. In Kim Il-sung's 
eyes,
Solidarity centered on the Soviet Union was _
necessary yesterday, is necessary today /I959/, 
and will be necessary tomorrow. This soli­
darity around the Soviet Union does not mean 
that somebody is dominating somebody else, 
it also does notjnean that__wg^are suffering 
from sadaeiuui /sycophancy^/.
Since P'yongyang did not reject Soviet teachings or deny
5^Joseph C. Run, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence," 
The Reporter, February 22, 1968, p. 19.
51Cited in Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of
Communist Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 24.
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M oscow’s position of supremacy, it must be stressed that 
their pro-Peking gestures from 1958 to 1961 were wholly 
independent of its posture toward the Soviet Union.
During the period of experimentation, the Korean
Communists emulated at least five major aspects of Chinese
behavior. According to Paige,
They decided to imitate the frantic pace of 
the Great Leap Forward, to combine economic 
and administrative units at the lowest rural 
administrative level, to reorganize the agri­
cultural cooperatives in the direction of the 
p eople’s communes, to adopt handicraft methods 
of local industrial production, and to make 
party organs directly responsible for economic 
and administrative decisions.
Less significant, but still important, was the Korean 
decision not to emulate one facet of Chinese behavior -- 
the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" Campaign. Under the slogan 
"Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools con­
tend," Mao Tse-tung invited his country’s academic, artis­
tic, and managerial intelligentsia to criticize his regime.
The reaction was so overwhelming that the critics had to
53
be silenced after six weeks. It seems that Premier Kim
52Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of 
Russian and Chinese Behavior," in Communist Strategies in 
A s i a . ed. by A. Doak Barnett (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 244.
53Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign 
and the Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 3.
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was unwilling to risk his leadership of the KWP by adopting 
such modes of self-criticism; and the Chinese experience 
with the "Hundred Flowers" movement most certainly must 
have reinforced K i m ’s solicitude over dissent.
Unquestionably, the most important event of this 
period was North Korea's imitation of the Great Leap 
Forward —  the Korean C h ’ollima (Flying Horse) movement.
The term was coined by Kim Il-sung in January of 1958,
when he urged the workers to "rush forward as if we were
—  —  5 4
riding a C h ’ollima /Flying Horse/." Once the movement
was fully initiated, six months later, its primary goal 
was the completion of the Five Year Plan ahead of its 
1961 target date. Since the C h ’ollima Undong (Flying 
Horse Movement) had such considerable consequences, a 
detailed look at its operation is entirely justified.
Clearly modeled on Communist China's Great Leap 
Forward which was launched a few months earlier, the Flying 
Horse Movement soon drew criticism from the Soviet capital.
^ W a n - s h i k  Yoo, "The Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Move­
ment," Korean Affairs, II, 3-4 (1963), p. 163. Literally 
translated Ch 'ollima Undong means Thousand-ri Horse Move­
ment. One ri equals about one-third of a mile, and this 
was the distance, a thousand ri s , that the mythical horse 
was said to have traveled in a day. For further explanation, 
see K u ark, "North K o r e a ’s Agricultural Development During 
the Post-War Period," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 90.
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The Russian Premier boldly stated that as long as a strong
socialist fortress like the Soviet Union existed, any endeavor
for leaping economic growth was more or less harmful to
55
the construction of socialism. Of course, Khrushchev’s
criticism was motivated by the threat such radical policies
presented to Soviet influence in the Communist world,
especially since the Chinese Communist Party had announced
that its chairman had solved the problem of constructing
56
Communism in underdeveloped countries.
Unlike the Russian Stakhanov movement which stressed 
a production augmentation drive, the Ch ’ollima movement 
aimed at not only increasing production but reforming the 
w o r k e r ’s ideology to support the production endeavors as 
well. To maximize the movement’s impact, the North Korean 
regime mobilized all available manpower for production 
and requested that those engaged in farming, livestock, 
fishing, forestry, transportation and communications, 
education, and the arts also participate in the C h ’ollima 
movement. The regime’s hierarchy established a frantic 
pace for the movement; for example, it was reported that
~*“*Yoo, ’’The C h ’ollima (Flying Horse) Movement,’’
Korean Affairs, II (1963), 164.
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 77.
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people were often forced to work more than fourteen hours
57a day. Their strenuous efforts paid great dividends for
Kim Il-sung, for in January 1960 he was able to announce
that the Five Year Plan had been fulfilled nearly two years
ahead of schedule.
Fortunately for Kim Il-sung, the C h ’ollima movement
had nowhere near the disastrous results that the Great
Leap Forward had inflicted on mainland China. A saving
factor could have been that Kim Il-sung (perhaps with
Russian persuasion) decided to abandon the movement a
58
year before the Chinese finally did. However, the move­
m e n t ’s undue concentration on heavy industry had severly 
tightened the industrial bottleneck in the North Korean 
economy and caused a serious imbalance between agriculture 
and industry by the time the Ch * ollima movement was over. 
Since then, Kuark observed, ’’The North Koreans seem to have
been cautious . . . and returned to the Leninist line in
„59agriculture. But regardless of its many failures, the
J^Cho, ’’The Politics of North K o r e a ’s Unification 
Policies,’’ World Politics . XIX (1967), 229.
58Joungwon Alexander Kim, ’’The Peak of Socialism in 
North Korea,” Asian Survey. VI (1965), 260.
59Kuark, ’’North Korea’s Agricultural Development
During the Post-War Period,” China Qtly., No. 14 (1963),
p. 91.
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movement did have a great impact on North Koreans. Over­
all, the C h ’ollima movement was neither a complete rejection 
of Soviet experience nor an exact imitation of Chinese 
behavior but rather a nativistic application of Marxism- 
Leninism, utilizing the valuable experiences of Russia as 
well as China.
The Flying Horse movement, in itself, brought about 
no radical divergence from the policy of achieving unifi­
cation by constructing a self-motif that had been in effect 
since 1953. However, events outside the state —  namely 
the 1960 student riots in Seoul and, later, the downfall 
of Syngman Rhee -- necessitated new, "peaceful” proposals 
for reunification from the D.P.R.K. In response to the 
popular interest in negotiations which accompanied the 
civil unrest in the South, Kim Il-sung proposed that a loose
confederation between the two halves of Korea be established
. . . 60
immediately as an initial step toward unification.
Specifically, the plan called for the creation of a "con­
federated government” by combining the existing North and 
South Korean governments and organizing a Supreme National 
Committee to administer such common state functions as
^ K o h ,  "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective,” Asian 
Survey, IX (1969 ), 269.
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foreign relations, currency, postal service, and cultural 
61
affairs. Representation on the Supreme National Committee
would be evenly distributed between North and South, and,
more importantly each side would have a veto.
Hedging against the confederation's rejection, Kim
suggested forming a Joint Economic Committee that would
coordinate only economic and commercial matters. This
committee was to be composed of businessmen and industrial
62
representatives from each side. In addition, offers were
tendered for cultural and other "non-political" exchanges. 
P'yongyang purposely appealed to the nationalistic senti­
ments of the South Koreans with slogans like "Chaju T 1onqil" 
("independent unification"). Many South Korean students 
were intoxicated by the propaganda from the North,but they 
failed to create enough pressure on their government to 
ensure negotiations. The Korean Communist party, without 
a viable party apparatus in the South, simply could not 
take advantage of the events of April 1960 which had all 
the potential for a Communist revolution.
As the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. drifted farther apart in
^ C h o , "The Politics of North K o r e a ’s Unification 
Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 231.
62Ibid., p. 232.
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the aftermath of the 20th CPSU Congress, Kim Il-sung was
faced with a serious dilemma for it obviously was difficult
to choose between his regime’s two benefactors. P'yongyang's
solution was to adopt a nebulous, middle-of-the-road policy.
Scalapino has outlined North Korea's techniques of neutralism
that were designed to placate both disputants as follows:
(1) Approximately equal space was accorded to the Soviet
Union and Communist China, and equally laudatory terms were
used to describe their respective accomplishments. The
one exception was that when listing the "fraternal socialist
allies" North Korea placed the U.S.S.R. first. (2) Only
complimentary terms about other Communist parties were used
in public, and the emphasis was on unbreakable solidarity.
(3) Revisionism was regarded as the bloc's primary internal
63
danger, and Yugoslavia was mercilessly attacked. In
all, North Korea managed to remain neutral between 1958 
and 1961, while exerting all of its energy to close the 
gap between the two Ccnmunist giants.
Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea,"
China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 43-44.
CHAPTER IV 
P 1YONGYANG-PEKING AXIS, 1962-1965
During the period of experimentation with Chinese 
policies, North Korea —  trying as it did to remain non- 
aligned —  gradually began to stray from the narrow and 
treacherous path separating Moscow from Peking. At first 
the evidence was inconclusive but, by late 1962, the world 
saw Kim Il-sung ?s regime firmly entrenched in the camp of 
Communist China. It seems that the Korean Worker Ts Party 
started to waver from its position of neutrality in the 
Sino-Soviet dispute in the aftermath of the Twenty-Second 
Congress of the CPSU held in 1961. At the congress, Kim 
Il-sung had hailed the U.S.S.R. as nthe recognized vanguard 
of the international Communist movement” and had declared 
that the "consolidation of unity with the CPSU is ther
duty of Communists of all countries and is a principle of
1
proletarian internationalism.” Yet, when Khrushchev openly 
attacked the Albanian party leadership -- provoking an
Alexander Dallin, e t . a l ., eds., Diversity in Inter­
national Communism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), p. 387.
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angry retort from Chou En-lai, Kim and his Korean delega-
2
tion had remained conspicuously silent. Under such cir­
cumstances, silence could easily be construed as an endorse­
ment of the Chinese position.
Immediately following the congress, North Korea again 
took up its middle-of-the-road tactics. For example, the 
North Korean regime selected two ceremonial occasions to 
unmistakably portray their non-alignment by sending an 
effusive message of congratulations to the Soviet Union 
on the forty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution 
and, on the next day, by dispatching words of praise to
the Albanian Party of Labor (Communist Party of Albania)
3
on its twentieth anniversary. Therefore, P'yongyang 
attempted to preserve its cautious attitude in the first 
months after the congress but divergences from Moscow 
endorsed positions gradually began to appear with increasing 
regularity.
Among the wide range of issues confronting the Com­
munist world during the 1961-1962 period, Chinese and
^Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea,"
China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 38-39.
3Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the 
Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs. XLI (January, 
1963), 329.
117
Korean Communists found themselves allied against the Soviets
on the following questions: Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba and
the Sino-Indian border dispute.
Ever since Khrushchev's 1955 overtures to reestablish
friendly relations with T i t o ’s Yugoslavia, friction had
existed between the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) and the 
4
CPSU. The Albanian party leadership feared that such a.
reconciliation eventually might lead to a restoration of
Yugoslav control over the APL, thus endangering their
5
personal positions. Another blow to the Albanian Com­
munists was Khrushchev’s attacks on Stalin for the late 
Soviet Premier was revered as Albania’s liberator, and 
Albanian Premier Hoxha faithfully adhered to his methods 
of control. Typical of the animosity existing between 
Albania and Yugoslavia was an exchange between Hoxha and 
Tito when the former accused the latter of being responsible 
for Albania’s domestic difficulties as well as those of
For a discussion of this friction, see William E. 
Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), and Stavre Skendi, ’’Albania
and the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” Foreign Affairs, XL (April 
1962), 471-78.
”*The Albanian Party of Labor was founded under the 
auspices of the Yugoslav Communist Party and remained under 
Yugoslav tutelage until Stalin expelled Tito from the 
Cominform in 1948.
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6
Hungary and Poland.
It was never clear whether the AlbanianTs first 
approached the Chinese Communists or vice versa, Regard­
less, the issue of Yugoslav revisionism quickly brought 
them into public accord. MSince May 1958,” Skendi reported, 
"the press of the two countries has never stopped dennouncing
Jugoslav revisionism, linking it often to the principle
7
of peaceful coexistence." In his endeavors to win the 
Yugoslavs back into the Soviet fold, Khrushchev attempted 
to silence Albanian criticism and, at the same time, to 
isolate the Chinese Communists from the rest of the Com­
munist community as punishment for its pro-Albanian stance. 
However, he failed on both counts for Hoxha and his com­
rades could not be muzzled and a new phenomenon in the 
Communist world —  neutralism -- prevented Chinese exclu­
sion. In regard to the latter, Scalapino explained, "The 
great bulk of the Asian Communist movement chose to remain 
non-aligned between Moscow and Peking, and this in itself 
was a defeat for Khrushchev, especially when, as in many
^For details of the exchange - see, Skendi, "Albania 
and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Foreign Affairs. XL (1962), 
472 .
'Ibid., p. 473.
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cases, it was non-alignment that leaned toward Peking.”
North Korea's position on the Albanian question typified 
this "pro-PekingM non-alignment.
Initially, Korean Communists maintained that rela­
tions between the CPSU and the APL were "abnormal” and that
if this situation persisted it would cause "grave damage”
9
to the Communist movement. In December 1961, Kim Il-sung 
said, "our party wishes to see a satisfactory solution to 
the Albanian question achieved through enduring efforts to 
remove present disputes and differences of views and to
attain mutual understanding in the full spirit of inter-
10
national solidarity . . .” At first, North Korea employed
the tactics of "mutual recognition" in the Albanian dispute 
as evidenced by the following statement: "We firmly believe
that the friendship and solidarity between the peoples of 
Albania and Korea will continue to develop and become stronger 
in the future under the principles of Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism -- within the great family of
8Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties 
of Asia," Foreign Affairs.,XLI (1963), 324.
9
Ibid., p . 328.
^ C i t e d  in Alexander Dallin, et a l ., eds., Diversity 
in International Communism, p. 390.
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11
the Socialist camp headed by the U.S.S.R."
Thus, the North Koreans stayed on the periphery of 
the Soviet-Albanian conflict and urged the respective parties 
to consent to negotiations so that inter-party harmony 
would be preserved. Then, in the early part of 1962, 
P fyongyang began to closely identify with Albania’s stance 
on Yugoslav revisionism. Finally, in March 1962, Kim II- 
sung openly showed his endorsement of H o x h a 's policies 
by entering into a direct agreement with his regime, dispite 
the fact that Albania remained a constant target of Russian 
criticism.
North K o r e a ’s non-aligned policy further gave way
in the wake of Soviet President Brezhnev’s September
1962 visit to Belgrade. Following the Sino-Albanian
lead, the KWP organs blasted the Tito revisionist clique as
soon as Brezhnev departed. For example, a P ’yongyang
newspaper reacted to the Brezhnev-Tito Summit in a September
28, 1962 editorial which "accused them /.the Yugoslavs^/ of
being revisionists who serve only to block the struggle of
12
the Communists against the Imperialists."
Speech made at a KWP meeting on November 8, 1961. 
Cited in Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," 
China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 39.
12Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course 
of North Korea," Koreana Qtly., V (1963), 50.
121
Later, in an October 1962 speech intitled "Immediate
Tasks of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea," Kim
Il-sung claimed: "The modern revisionists represented by
the Tito clique of Yugoslavia are faithfully serving U.S.
imperialism, attempting to undermine the unity of the
socialist camp, defend the aggressive maneuvers of imperial
ism and paralyse the revolutionary struggle of the popular 
13
masses." He went on by attacking all revisionists for 
"their vicious policy of slandering and dividing the 
Socialist countries, in an attempt to overthrow the parties 
and governments of these countries. This last statement
strongly suggests that Premier Khrushchev himself was being 
brought under attack for revisionist tactics. Therefore, 
just as in the Albanian dispute, North Korea had endorsed 
the Chinese position and attacked Yugoslav revisionism 
much to the dismay of the CPSU.
Khrushchev’s adventurism and capitulation in Cuba 
was widely criticized by the Korean Communists for it 
brought to mind the frustration and dissappointment they 
themselves had experienced during the Korean War. Indeed,
^3Cited in Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North
Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 32.
~*~^Tbid. , 42 .
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North Korea had been the first victim of such policies 
when the Soviets set it up and then unexpectedly left it 
stranded in the face of American resistance. In fact, 
the North Korean press never did report the existence or 
removal of Russian missiles from Cuba, perhaps fearing 
that excessive public indignation over Moscow’s retreat 
would breed undesirable results. Meanwhile, Radio 
P ’yongyang continually censured the Soviet Union for its 
"soft line,"16
In addition to bitter memories, the Cuban missile 
crisis raised an important question of whether or not the 
Soviet Union -- in adhering to its policy of peaceful 
coexistence -- would ever risk a possible confrontation 
with the United States for the defense of a socialist 
ally. Judging from the Cuban case and their own experience, 
the North Korean leadership reached a negative verdict.
The Cuban crisis marked an important alteration in North 
Korean policy. As Thomas An stated, ’’P ’yongyang abruptly 
abandoned its ’neutralist’ posture and, after January 1963,
«
15
Roy U. T. Kim, ”Sino-North Korean Relations,’’
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 718.
16
Il-kun Ham, ’’The North Korean Regime and the Sino- 
Soviet Dispute,” Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), p. 145.
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began solidly backing Communist China on practically all
_ ,17
issues m  the S m o - Soviet clash.
North Korea fully supported China in its border 
conflict with India just as it had openly backed Cuba . 
against the United States. Soon after the border entangle­
ments became intensified, the North Korean communications
media launched a vigorous campaign against the Nehru 
18
government. For instance, editorials stated, "India 
has made illegal encroachments upon the territory of China 
and the reactionary circles of the Indians have risen 
against China, instigated and abetted by A m e r i c a . I n  
most cases, Korean propaganda blasts at the Indians were 
accompanied by persistent demands for a peaceful settle­
ment. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), for example, 
broadcasted the following: "The Korean people are of the
opinion that India should discontinue at once its illegal 
intrusion into Chinese territory, withdraw its troops from
17An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Com­
munism , XV (1966), 69.
^^Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," 
China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 42-43.
^ T h i s  particular statement appeared in the September 
26, 1962 issue of Nodong Sinmum (P *yongyang). See Ham,
"The North Korean Regime and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," 
Korean Affairs, II (1963), 144-45.
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that territory, and respond to the Just proposal of the
P . R . C . o n  settling the question in dispute by way of 
20negotiation." A few contend that North Korea's support 
for Communist China was not really very enthusiastic be­
cause Kim Il-sung did not wish to Jeopardise his country's
21
newly established trade relations with India. How 
enthusiastic their support actually was is hard to determine, 
but it is known that P'yongyang's advocacy of China's 
cause did bring the regime into direct conflict with Moscow
which had sided with New Delhi.
By the end of 1962, North Korean expressions of 
neutralism must have had an ominous ring in Soviet ears.
Soon the subtlety vanished from the North Korean attacks 
on revisionism and peaceful coexistence, and the P'yong- 
yang-Peking Axis was firmly cemented by their mutual 
hostility to Moscow's "self-centered" policies. Probably, 
Communist China gained North Korea as an ally not by its
own doing but rather because the Soviet Union had committed
these successive foreign policy blunders -- the most notable
^^KCNA broadcast to Asia in English, 0600 GMT,
September 26, 1963. For transcript see, "Daily Reports," 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sept. 27, 1963.
21 For example, see Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet 
Dispute and North Korea," p. 302.
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being the Cuban missile crisis.
The coup d 1etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea was 
a more immediate factor driving the P'yongyang regime to 
the side of Red China. The coup ushered in a defiantly 
anti-Communist, military regime headed by General Park 
Chung-hee. Kim Il-sung sensed a military threat from the 
South, and a Jittery North Korea' became thoroughly con­
vinced that the United States and South Korea were only
marking, time before they would attack in an attempt to
22
destroy the D.P.R.K. This fear led North Korean leaders
to renew their contacts with the two giants of the Com­
munist bloc in hopes of committing them to North Korea's 
defense*
In search of foreign support, Kim hurriedly traveled
to Moscow and Peking in July 1961. At the Kremlin, on
July 6th, Premier Kim signed a formal ten-year military
assistance treaty. Scalapino noted,
In speeches for the occasion, Kim and Khrush­
chev sought to strike common notes : the menace
of American imperialism in Asia, the great 
progress of the Communist world, and its un­
breakable unity . . . The Kremlin speeches 
certainly covered the basic ground 'correctly' 
in a formal sense.
22
Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," 
Asian Survey, V (1965), 379.
^Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea,"
China Qtly.. No. 14 (1963), pp. 37-38.
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Before leaving Moscow, Kim Il-sung signed a Joint communique 
railing "deviations from the principles of socialist inter­
nationalism," phraseology which in this context could only
24
be aimed at Peking's anti-Moscow activities.
From the Soviet capital Kim and his party flew directly 
to Peking, where on July 11 an almost identical treaty was 
concluded with the Chinese People's Republic. While in 
Peking, Kim heaped praise upon Chinese leaders, "asserting 
that their successful construction of Socialism was con­
solidating the power of the whole Socialist camp, and of 
particular encouragement to the peoples of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America in their struggle for peace, national
25
independence and social progress." In the Joint Sino- 
Korean communique issued on Kim's departure (July 15th), 
he and Chou En-lai declared that the chief danger to world 
Communism was "Yugoslav revisionism", the euphemism that
2 6Peking commonly employed to denote "soft" Soviet policies. 
Thus, in the space of three short weeks, Kim Il-sung had 
parroted the lines of both Moscow and Peking but this
^ Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 380.
25
Qited in Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North 
Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 38.
^^See Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 380, 
and The New York Times, July 21, 1961, p. 3.
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was thought to be a comparatively small price to pay for 
the military benefits he had so dexterously reaped from 
his nation*s rival suitors.
From articles inserted in both treaties, the D.P.R.K. 
obviously tried to protect its "independent" position in 
a steadily worsening Sino-Soviet dispute. Each document 
emphasized North Korea's independence, territorial integrity, 
and autonomy of internal affairs. More specifically, they 
accentuated P'yongyang's strict neutrality in dealing with 
Moscow and Peking. For example, Article 2 of the Soviet- 
Korean treaty underlined that "each of the parties under­
takes to conclude no alliance and to participate in no 
.coalition or action directed against the other;" while 
Article 3 of the Sino-Korean treaty stressed that "neither 
party should conclude any alliance directed against the
other party or take part in any bloc or any action or
27
measures directed against the other party." Thus, the
U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. unofficially recognized the D.P.R.K.Ts
neutrality for as Zagoria said "each preferred to keep the
Asian parties in the middle rather than see them openly
2 8
allied with the other."
*
i
27 Portions of the two treaties are cited in Roy U. T. 
Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,’* Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 
717-18.
28
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 380.
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With a potential military invasion threatening from 
his Southern flank, Kim Il-sung grew even less enthusiastic 
about the Kremlin's policy of achieving a detente with the 
West. The Soviet reaction to American demands in the Cuban 
crisis made them even more apprehensive of Soviet intentions. 
Then, when former Defense Minister Kim Kwang-hyop visited 
Moscow in November 1962 to request additional military
29
aid, he was apparently cold-shouldered by Kremlin leaders.
Because of this and similar incidents, Kim Il-sung concluded
that the Soviet Union offered little in the way of assistance
or protection.
Under such circumstances, North Korea had only two
alternatives: it could either put itself at the mercy of
the Communist Chinese or strike out on an independent
course. They decided to go it alone at a December 1962
Central Committee plenary meeting, when the KWP leadership
30adopted what it referred to as a ’’military line. ” The 
"military line" consisted of modernizing and strengthening 
North K o r e a ’s military capacity in anticipation of an in­
vasion from the South. Essentially, it placed the entire
29Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII
(1969), 24.
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country on a war footing. B. C. Koh listed the following
goals of the new "military line": (1) make a cadre out
of every soldier, (2) modernize the army, (3) arm the
entire people, and (4) turn the whole country into an
31
impenetrable fortress. Therefore, North Korea began to 
organize itself into a garrison state.
In conjunction with the' "military line", the D.P.R.K. 
altered its strategy for communizing the South in order 
to take into account the appearance of a military regime 
in the South. Although P'yongyang continued to issue pro­
nouncements advocating the peaceful unification of the 
peninsula without foreign interference, the regime was 
actually planning to launch a war of national liberation 
in the South. At the same December 1962 plenary meeting,
Kim proclaimed: "They /the South Korean people/ should
rise up in a nationwide struggle to repel and smash the
32
reckless onslought of the counterrevolution." The North 
Korean hierarchy still believed that unification hinged 
on the D.P.R.K.fs rapid advance toward socialism, not 
only in the creation of a self-image but in the development 
of a military capacity as well.
3 1 T K . ,Ibid.
32
Cited in Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unifica­
tion Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 236-37.
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In the wake of the 1962 "military line", there was a
sharp increase in cease-fire violations by North Korean
forces. These attacks along the thirty-eighth parallel
were somewhat reminiscent of the events that preceeded
33
the June 25, 1950 attack. They also paralleled the Com­
munist strategy in uniting another divided Asian country —  
Vietnam. According to Scalapino,
Basically, the tactics and strategy of North 
Korean Communists are similar to those of the 
North Vietnamese Communists. The Communist 
leaders of North Korea hope to see the develop­
ment of a "liberation front," a political- 
military movement in South Korea dedicated 
to the support of the communist unification 
plan, and operating as a broad nationalist- 
Communist a l l i a n c e . ^
Kim Il-sung was firmly convinced that the route to unifica­
tion laid along bellicose actions of subversion and infiltra­
tion designed to overthrow the Park Chung-hee government. 
However, -such tactics and strategy were no longer acceptable 
according to the Kremlin; whereas, the Red Chinese enthusi­
astically promoted national liberation movements throughout 
Asia. Therefore, P'yongyang’s unification policy placed
^ % l e n n  D. Paige, "1966: Korea Creates the Future,"
Asian Survey, VII (January, 1967), 27.
^Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea,"
China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 35.
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the regime in sympathy with Chinese position in the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
Again, the question of Moscow’s peaceful coexistence
policy had arisen in connection with unification. Kim
Il-sung always saw the United States as the major barrier
to communizing the entire peninsula. "The issues between
Russia and China in 1960," according to Zagoria, "must
have appeared to /the North Koreans/ primarily as a question
of whether there was going to be a bloc-wide policy of
militant struggle designed to remove the Americans from
35
South Korea and the rest of the western Pacific. By
1962, the Kim Il-sung regime came to believe that "Peking’s
more militant line offered more protection from the United
States and was more likely in the long run to bring about
36
Korean unification on Communist terms."
Other explanations for the Sino-North Korean alignment 
focus on geographic propinquity, common culture, collabora­
tion in the Korean War, common anti-Western bias, shared
35Leopold Labedz and G. R. Urban, The Sino-Soviet 
Conflict (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1964),
p. 65.
Haggard, "North K o r e a ’s International Position,” 
Asian Survey, V (1965), 376.
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37
problems of underdevelopment, and historic xenophobia.
Yet, these reasons, including North K o r e a ’s desire for
reunification, were not the sole determining factors in the
emergence of a P *yongyang-Peking Axis. Perhaps it was that
the Soviet Union proved to be its own worst enemy. For
besides its foreign policy blunders, Moscow had outwardly
displayed the tactics of "big'-power’’ chauvinism in its
relations with P ’yongyang and ignored the principles of
equality and mutual respect among fraternal parties in its
38
dealings with the Korean W o r k e r ’s Party. There was some
evidence, for example, that the Kremlin inspired an intense
intra-party struggle in the KWP around November 1962, when
the remnants of the old Soviet-Korean clique demanded the
country return to its former association with the Soviet 
39
Union. Therefore, Khrushchev’s ’’adventuristic" foreign 
policy, failure to make a firm defense commitment, and 
meddling in intra-party affairs probably played a major 
role in the North Korean decision.
37For such explanations, see Ham, "The North Korean 
Regime and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Korean Affairs. II 
(i963), 147, and Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the 
Course of North Korea,” Koreana Qtly. , V (1963), 52.
38
Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 135.
39Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 227.
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It is interesting to note that Donald Zagoria believes
that the Korean Communists were the earliest Chinese ally
in the dispute. He maintains that North Korean support for
the Chinese position goes back at least to 1960 for as he
claims "They certainly supported the Chinese at the Moscow
Conference in 1960 and they were in the field alongside the
40
Chinese before the Albanians.
Regardless of the exact date, Moscow did not delay 
in retaliating once it became evident that North Korea 
had joined the Chinese camp. Kremlin leaders demanded 
that P'yongyang be severely penalized for its deviant
behavior and quickly curtailed its economic and, particularly,
. . .  41
military assistance to North Korea. In addition to
economic sanctions, Khrushchev went so far as to excommuni­
cate the KWP from the international Communist community.
In the 1963 edition of the International Yearbook of Poli­
tics and Economics published by the Moscow Institute of 
World Economy and International Relations, North Korea
was excluded, along with Albania and Communist China, from
42
the family of socialist countries. Thereafter, only
Labedz and Urban, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 65.
41
Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 266.
42Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. xvi.
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Albania, China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and a few nonruling 
Communist and labor parties remained on friendly terms 
with North Korea.
In 1963, North Korea attempted a double edged position 
in the Sino-Soviet dispute in that, it openly supported 
Peking while it was attempting to forestall a worsening of 
relations with Moscow. But such a stance proved to be 
impossible as the split became progressively more discern­
ible. For example, at the congress of the East German Com­
munist Party in January 1963, the KWP was publicly snubbed 
for its pro-Peking line. For once the congress was officially 
convened, the Korean Communists were denied the opportunity 
to make a customary congratulatory speech and then syste­
matically excluded from presenting its case in written 
43
form. Duly incensed, Nodonq Sinmun (a P'yongyang news­
paper) responded by extinguishing any lingering doubts
about the regime's ideological alliance with Peking with
44
an explicit defense of the Chinese Communist position.
In a later Nodonq Sinmun editorial, the KWP stressed that
43K°h, The Foreign Policy of North K o r e a , p. 66.
44For excerpts of the Jan. 30, 1963 edition of 
Nodonq Sinmum that featured the defense of the Chinese 
position, see ibid., p. 67.
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"it was impossible . . • that one big power could represent
the socialist camp and dictate the course of the world 
. 4 5revolution." Although the criticism printed in the
North Korean papers was often brutal, the regime, on the
whole, did try to go out of its way not to antagonize
the Russians in 1963.
However, throughout 1964, the animosity between
Moscow and P ’yongyang steadily increased. The North
Korean regime continued to issue venomous attacks against
the revisionist camp, "wbich amounted to a declaration of
46
war upon Khrushchev and his successors." Griffith sumradd
up North K o r e a ’s position in the Sino-Soviet dispute for
1964 thusly: " P ’yongyang explicitly refused to attend
Khrushchev’s planned conference, defended the Chinese
splitting policies, and by September 1964 was attacking
Moscow explicitly for Soviet economic policies toward
North Korea and Soviet interference in North K o r e a ’s
47
internal affairs."
There seems to be no clear consensus why North Korea
45 The editorial appeared on Oct. 28, 1963. Cited in 
Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," pp. 133-34.
^ Ibid. , p. 133.
William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964- 
1965," China Quarterly, No. 25 (1960), p. 77.
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became more closely aligned with the Chinese Communists 
in 1964. Perhaps, Soviet cut backs in foreign aid and 
attempts to isolate P ’yongyang forced Kim Il-sung to adopt
i.
a more recalcitrant attitude toward Moscow. Or, as Patrick
J. Honey suspected, the Russians may have attempted some
manoeuvre to replace Kim Il-sung, causing him naturally
48
to turn more toward China. Whatever the cause, relations
between Moscow and P'yongyang had been reduced to an absolute
minimum by the end of 1964.
However, during the year North Korea actively pursued
a policy of extending relations with other socialist and
non-socialist states. In a large part, such a policy may
have been necessitated by their excummunication from the
Soviet bloc in 1963. Kim Il-sung journeyed to Indonesia
in April and met with President Sukarno. As a result of
this visit, the two countries established formal diplomatic 
49
relations. Then, C h ’oe Yong-gon -- Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly visited the 
UAR, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, and Cambodia in November and
Honey, by his own admission, has no positive proof 
that such an event did take place. See Labedz and Urban, 
The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 64.
49Chong-sik Lee, ’’Korea: Troubles in a Divided
State,” Asian Survey, V (January, 1965), 30.
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December; and early the next year Premier Kim sent his
special envoy -- Vice Foreign Minister Kim Tae-hui —
50
on an African tour. As these trips indicate, North
Korea concentrated on establishing relations with the
"uncommitted nations" of the Third World.
One of the highlights of 1964 for P ’yongyang was the
hosting of the Asian Economic Seminar which met from June
17 to June 23. Representatives of twenty-eight nations —
including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan —  attended
and discussed topics, such as "Self-Reliant Recovery and
Construction of Independent National Economy" and "Neo-
51
Colonialism and the Asian Economy." The seminar drew
sharp criticism from Moscow; for example, Pravda charged
that it was "guided by interests far removed from the
economic problems of Asian countries" and that it sought
to "split the Asian and African movements" and "vilify
52
the socialist countries."
Although a Soviet-Korean trade pact was renewed and
50
C. I. Eugene Kim, 'Korea in the Year of Ulsa, " 
Asian Survey. VI (January, 1966), 39.
"*^For a more detailed account of the Seminar, see 
Chong-sik Lee, 'Korea: Troubles in a Divided State,"
Asian Survey, V (1965), 29-30.
52Ibid., p. 30.
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a group of Russian technicians was dispatched to North
Korea, conditions remained basically unchanged until the
CPSU ousted Khrushchev on October 17, 1964. This event
evoked no immediate response from P ’yongyang except for
a congratulatory letter to the new leaders of the Soviet 
53
regime. Unlike the Chinese, the North Koreans never
speculated on the factors causing Khrushchev’s fall from
power. Instead, P ’yongyang ignored the past and stressed
the indispensability of unity for the socialist camp.
After October 1964, Griffith wrote,
P ’yongyang made it clear that it continued 
to differ with Moscow and agreed with Peking 
on policy toward the United States, on re­
visionism (including support for the pro- 
Chinese parties and opposition to their pro- 
Moscow opponents), on Albania (with which 
cordial relations were still maintained), 
and on ’’self-sufficiency”, independen^al 1 - 
round industrialization, and Rumania.
Such statements indicated that P ’yongyang's policy toward
Moscow, in the post-Khrushchev period, would be based on
the latter’s actual performance that is, the Soviet Union
would have to present a stronger front toward the United
States and increase its support to the revolutionary
~*2Roy U. T. Kim, ”Sino-North Korean Relations,” 
Asian Survey. VIII (1968), 719.
■^Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations" China Qtly., 
No. 25 (1966), p. 77.
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struggle to win the allegiance of the North Korean regime.
The most important aspect of the Sino-North Korean 
alliance from 1962 to 1965 was not so much the existence 
of ideological ties but rather a dominant motive which 
drew the two countries together and gave some permanency 
to their tenuous union amidst the tempest of the Com­
munist doctrinal polemics of the times. This magnetic 
motivating force was the common desire for independence. 
Nationalism had made a tremendous impact on both their 
foreign policies and dictated the assumption of independent 
positions. Therefore, North Korea’s rejection of the Soviet 
Union was, in essence, a reaction to the U.S.S.JR. ’s neo­
colonial intervention in its internal political affairs 
and manipulation of its economy.
In reality, North Korea had not enlisted in the Chinese 
camp solely out of reverence for Red C h i n a ’s ideological 
position but rather had done so in an attempt to further 
its own perceived national interests. That is, Kim Il-sung 
fully expected his affinity with Mao Tse-tung to facilitate 
his primary goals of Korean unification and the construc­
tion of a viable self-image for North Korea. However, 
national self-interest did not provide a strong, permanent 
foundation for the P ’yongyang-Peking Axis for, as Koh 
observed, ’’North K o r e a ’s perception of its national self-interest
140
could be no more steady than the hostile tides with which
55it had to contend." Therefore, when 1965 brought about 
changing conditions that indicated its national self- 
interests would be served best by a rapprochement with 
the U.S.S.R., the D.P.R.K. did not hesitate to leave the 
Chinese camp in search of greener pastures closer to 
Moscow.
■^Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p . 81.
CHAPTER V
RECONCILIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1965-
In retrospect, North Korea really never had totally 
committed itself to the Chinese position in the Sino- 
Soviet shism. Instead, the Korean Communists merely had 
emitted emotional, pro-Chinese responses to the stimuli 
of Soviet intra-bloc politics. As was readily seen, the 
Kremlin’s actions —  which usually placed P ’yongyang on 
the defensive -- constantly provoked emotional outbursts 
from the North Korean press. Yet, three fruitless years 
of collaboration with Red China and a resulting lack of 
progress toward his national objectives led Kim Il-sung 
to reappraise his foreign policy position in 1965. Being 
a pragmatist, Premier Kim realized that his intimate 
association with Communist China actually may have been 
inimical to North K o r e a ’s self-interests. Accordingly, 
the North Korean hierarchy agreed that their goals of 
national independence and unification might, in fact, 
be best served by a reconciliation with the U.S.S.R.
Before summarizing the circumstances which led to 
a policy re-evaluation, one point must be clarified. North
141
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Korea did not necessarily undergo an ideological reorienta- 
f tion at this time. Actually, after its rapprochement with 
Moscow, P ’yongyang remained much closer ideologically to 
Peking than the Kremlin. Thus, the heads, and not the 
hearts, of the North Korean leaders dictated a reversal 
• in their international posture, resulting in a swing of 
almost one hundred and eighty degrees from a pro-Chinese 
to a pro-Soviet stance.
Of the half dozen or more probable reasons causing
North K o r e a ’s deviation from the Chinese line, financial
problems were the most immediate. For after enjoying
continuous economic prosperity since the Korean War,
North Korea now had difficulty in fulfilling the ambitious
goals of its Seven Year Plan (1961-1967). The plan had
called for an optimum G.N.P. growth of more than ten
percent annually in an attempt to further enhance the
1
D.P.R.K.'s image as a worker’s paradise. In formulating 
the plan, the Koreans had deviated noticeably from previous 
Russian models by concentrating its emphasis on light 
rather than heavy industry during the first years. After
^C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of U l s a , "
Asian Survey. VI (1966), 39.
2
Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," 
Pacific Affairs. XXXVIII (1965-1966), 298-99.
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a futile attempt to dissuade the Koreans from implementing 
their plan, the Soviets showed their displeasure by exerting 
their economic leverage.
The cessation of Soviet economic assistance caused 
the D.P.R.K. to fall far behind the projected production 
quotas of the Seven Year Plan. For not only had the North 
Koreans established pretentious and unrealistic targets, 
but a number of unforeseen circumstances arose that hampered 
the p l a n ’s completion. First, the production limits of 
many products had been reached already, and further techni­
cal advancement was hindered by the withdrawal of Soviet 
3
advisers. Frankly, North K o r e a ’s economy was overheated
from years of rapid expansion and simply had reached a
point of diminishing returns. Second, the unexpected
emergence of a military regime in the South had necessitated
the diversion of a substantial amount of North Korea’s
already scarce resources from industrial expansion to
4
military spending. The rise in military expenditures 
was accentuated by the Soviet U n i o n ’s cutback in military 
aid allocations to North Korea. Chinese assistance simply
3
Joungwon Alexander Kim, ’’The Peak of Socialism in 
North Korea,” Asian Survey, VI (1965), 268.
^Koh, ’’North Korea,” Problems of Communism. XVIII
(1969), 22.
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could not compensate for the funds North Korea forfeited
by antagonizing the Kremlin.
By 1963, there were outward indications that the
Seven Year Plan was faltering. Most notable was the
announcement that the light industrial period would be
extended another year."* Conditions continued to worsen;
the official figures —  usually inflated —  revealed that
the plan never did achieve the desired growth rate of
6
eighteen percent. The D.P.R.K.Ts decision in 1966 to 
extend the entire plan for three more years spoke for 
itself. Ever mindful that economic disaster could spell 
ruin for North Korea's self-image and, ultimately, unifi­
cation, the KWP press exhorted the public with such phrases
as "We must meet our production goals, because in this way
7
we can liberate our brothers in the South." Therefore, 
P'yongyang was faced with the reality that after more 
than a decade and a half of independence it still was 
dependent on the technical and economic assistance bestowed
Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in 
North Korea," Asian Survey, VI (1965), 262.
^Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 267.
7
Cited in C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of 
U l s a ," Asian Survey. VI (1966), 38-39.
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by its former mother country, the Soviet Union.
As was previously indicated, North Korea sorely needed
Soviet military assistance in order to strengthen and
modernize its armed forces. Since its founding, the North
Korean Army had been dependent on Soviet military hard- 
8
ware. When Khrushchev abruptly terminated Soviet military
assistance to Korea in 1963, he seriously impaired North
K o rea’s defense capabilities. For example, this move
halted Soviet shipments of Jet fuel and spare parts for
the five hundred Soviet-supplied MIG-15 Jet fighters,
9
leaving North Korea with a crippled air force.
Also, P ’yongyang became more disillusioned, and 
even disgusted, with Chinese conduct in regard to the 
Vietnamese War. Koh stated, "Mao's refusal to Join with 
the Soviet Union in a Communist united front against U.S.
timperialist aggression’ in Vietnam infuriated P'yong- 
1°
yang. Whereas, the Soviet Union, in response to regular
American air strikes on North Vietnam, increased its 
assistance to Ho Chi Minh and stiffened its attitude toward
Q
Berger, The Korean K n o t , p. 228.
9 .An, ’’New Winds in Pyongyang?, ” Problems of Communism,
XV (1966), 70.
10 
K o h ,
(1969), 26.
^^ h, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII
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the United States. The latter fs policy pleased the North
Korean ruling clique and gave them hope that Khrushchev's
policy of peaceful coexistence was being re-evaluated by
11
the new Kremlin leadership. Because China so far had 
failed to make a positive contribution to the war, P'yong- 
yang began to suspect that Mao was merely exhorting Ho Chi 
Minh to commit military suicide.
Finally, North Korean nationalism -- or perhaps more 
accurately, Kim Il-sung's egotism -- most certainly in­
fluenced the regime's rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.
The ideological alliance between the D.P.R.K. and the 
P.R.C. often had led foreigners to the hasty assumption 
that North Korea was a Chinese satellite which irked Kim 
Il-sung. Koh believed,
P'yongyang found the role of the junior partner 
to a Peking regime afflicted with megalomania 
increasingly distasteful. Mao Tse-tung's im­
modest claim to be the fountainhead of revolu­
tionary strategy and ideological orthodoxy not 
only for all Asian Communists but for the 
Communists throughout the world deeply annoyed 
the independent-minded and parcissictic Kim 
II-song. 2
Moreover, China's internal situation alarmed North
Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," 
Asian Survey, V (1965), 376.
^2Koh, "North Korea.," Problems of Communism, XVIII
(1969). 26.
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Korean leaders, and precautions were taken to prevent
the Cultural Revolution and Red Guard Movement from
spilling over into Korea. For instance, Nodong Sinmun
has never carried an article on the Red Guard, while the
13
danger of dogmatism frequently has been mentioned.
Overall, the posture of North Korea in 1965 was best sum­
marized by Griffith; he wrote,
North Korea . . . has not only returned to
neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute but also, 
like Rumania, has become at least for the pre­
sent a truly "nationalist communist" regime 
determining its own policies, furthering its 
own influence, and balancing skillfully between 
the two communist giants. Moscow has been the
winner thereby, but only because it has been
• 14prepared to adjust to Korean desires.
The Soviet Union's first manifest act toward re­
establishing normal relations with North Korea was Premier 
Kosygin's state visit to P'yongyang in February 1965.
After reaffirming Russian friendship with the Korean people, 
Kosygin said -- in an apparent attempt to soften North 
Korea's militancy -- that "We in the Socialist camp can 
be proud of the fact that we are marching together in the 
greatest movement of our time," but we must never forget
13
Soon Sung C h o , "Korea: Election Year," Asian
Survey, VIII (January, 1968), 40.
^^Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," 
China Qtly., No. 25 (1966), p. 79.
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that "imperialism, although losing momentum, is still
strong and that struggle against it is by no means easy.
The cordial reception accorded the Soviet premier seemed
to herald a turning point in North Korean policy. For
after February 1965, P ryongyang ceased to reiterate Peking’s
vicious tirades against the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership
and toned down its references to "modern revisionism"
16
considerably. Overall, the premier’s visit was a great
success for the Soviet Union because he apparently lured
P ’yongyang into a neutral position in the intra-bloc
struggle with promises of economic rewards -- the first
of which began arriving three,months later in the form of
17
military hardware.
Taking advantage of a trip to Indonesia in the 
spring of 1965, Kim Il-sung was quick to elaborate on 
his country’s independent position. His speeches to the 
Indonesian people followed the chuch’e theme; for example, 
Premier Kim maintained that the North Korean economy was
^~*Cited in Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," 
Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 304-05.
"^An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Com­
munism. XV (1966), 68.
17C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of U l s a ," 
Asian Survey, VI (1966), 40.
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rebuilt after the Korean War largely through the efforts
of the Korean people and not a single direct reference was
18
made to foreign assistance. By emphasizing the point
that the KWP "invariably” adopted an independent stance
in its'foreign relations, Kim Il-sung portrayed a North
Korean foreign policy that was very similar to those of
the Third World states.
Meanwhile, there was a visible deterioration in
Sino-North Korean relations. For instance, in honor of
North K o r e a ’s twentieth anniversary on August 15, 1965,
the U.S.S.R. dispatched a high level delegation headed by
Alexander N. Shelepin -- member of the CPSU Presidium and
Secretariat and a rising young man in the Kremlin; while
in marked contrast, the P.R.C. sent an undistinguished
delegation led by Wu Hsin-y —  deputy secretary-general
of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and
not even a member of the Central Committee; furthermore,
19
the Albanians sent no delegation at all. The P y o n g ­
yang regime was deeply offended by Peking’s behavior. In 
retaliation, Nodonq Sinmun editorials praised the Soviet
18
Haggard, "North K o r e a ’s International Position," 
Asian Survey. V (1965), 379.
19For details, see Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations," 
China Qtlv., No. 25 (1966), p. 79.
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Union in glowing terms for its part in "crushing Japanese
militarism and liberating our country," while it conspicuously
20
omitted any reference to Communist China. Later, the
Korean Communists returned the Chinese snub by rejecting
an invitation to the October 1, 1965 celebration of the
People’s Republic of China’s sixteenth anniversary.
By 1966, it was clear that P ’yongyang was attempting
to play the classic role of the balancer in the Sino-Soviet
struggle for hegemony. Kim Il-sung hoped to extract the
maximum political and economic advantage that could be
achieved in playing Mao against the Brezhnev-Kosygin team.
But in order to succeed at such a policy, North Korea had
to steer a course midway between Moscow and Peking. For
example, when China declared that to oppose imperialism
it is imperative to oppose revisionism, Premier Kim lashed
out that "any party, no matter which it is, must not regard
other fraternal parties as going against Marxism-Leninism
fr21
because their stand is different from its own . . .
Whereas, only five days before, its delegates had remained
20Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy,"
Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 305.
21 Kim Il-sung’s statement was made at a KWP conference 
on October 5, 1966. Cited in Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North 
Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 721.
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for the Communist Chinese National Day parade after the
22Soviets had walked out. Such was Premier K i m ’s neutral
stance that when asked what side of the dispute he was
on, he replied, quite naturally, on the side of Marxism- 
23
Leninism.
North K o r e a ’s behavior made it subject to charges of 
opportunism from other Communist states. In an effort to 
counteract this criticism, Nodonq Sinmum on August 12, 1966 
published an editorial entitled "Let Us Defend Our In­
dependence" that spelled out P'yongyang’s independent
24
position in unusually bold language. Most observers
interpreted the editorial’s doctrinal statements as further
evidence of national differentiation within the Communist 
25
bloc. While "some critics in Seoul," according to 
Paige, "argued that the editorial ought to be interpreted
22
The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1966, p. 1.
23
Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,"
Asian Survey. VIII (1968), 721.
24
For the complete text of the editorial m  English, 
see transcript of KCNA International Service, 1706 GMT,
Aug. 11, 1966, in "Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Informa 
tion Service, August 12, 1966.
25For American newspaper commentaries, see Drew 
Middleton, "North Korean Reds Rej'ect Chinese or Soviet 
Control," The New York Times, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 1., and 
Robert Trumbull, "North Korea Talks ’Independence’," The 
New York Times, Aug. 21, 1966, sec. E, p . 3.
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more as a subterfuge designed to appeal to South Korean
desires for unification and to disguise the subservience
26
of the North to the Soviet Union.
The editorial asserted that North Korea was its 
own master and demonstrated the correctness of the in­
dependent line. Doctrinal statements, such as "Communists 
cannot live ideologically shackled to anyone" and "revolu­
tion can neither be exported or imported," closely paralleled 
Kim Il-sungTs philosophy of chuch Te . Therefore, the 
editorial contained nothing new or startling but rather 
was an echo of the 1955 Chuch ’e speech.
At the time, many correspondents speculated that the 
editorial’s references to "ideological survivals of flunky-
ism" in the party implied that another KWP purge was in 
27the making. Sure enough, two months later a reshuffling
28
of the Korean Worker’s Party took place. In its after-
math, the notable Soviet-Koreans Nam II and Chong H-y o n ,  
in addition to Yenan Communist Kim C h ’ang-man, were
2 6
Paige, "1966: Korea Creates the Future," Asian
Survey. VII (1967), 28-29.
27Middleton, "North Korean Reds Reject Chinese or 
Soviet Control," The New York Times. Aug. 13, 1966, p. 2.
28For details of the party shake up, see Koh, "North 
Korea," Problems of Communism. XVIII (1969), 20-21.
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conspicuously absent from the leadership. Of those re­
maining in positions of power, most had close personal 
connections with Chairman Kim Il-sung; for example, Kim 
II —  the second in command of North Korea —  previously
had served under the Chairman in the Manchurian guerrilla 
29
campaigns. With the 1966 purge, the partisan faction 
eliminated its last foreign rivals and assured its absolute 
control of the KWP.
As a result of the shakeup, a large number of high 
ranking army officers were recruited into the KWP ’ s upper 
echelon, leading to the belief that there was some con­
nection between the changes in leadership and the increase
30
in North Korean belligerence. It is' difficult to estimate
how influential the new military members were in the de­
cisions to augment hostile activities in the South. How­
ever, the entire North Korean ruling clique remained firmly 
convinced that violence was necessary and continued to 
delude themselves with the fantasy that if American troops 
were forced to withdraw the South Korean population would 
overthrow their government and install a pro-Communist regime.
29
Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 118.
30Run, "Behind North K o r e a ’s New Belligerence,"
Reporter, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 21.
154
In 1967, P'yongyang's position in the Sino-Soviet
dispute assumed a more stationary posture. North Korea
had cautiously allied itself” with the Soviet Union. In
fact, not a single anti-Soviet article appeared in Nodonq
Sinmun after December 1966. Relations with China, however,
ran hot and cold and, generally, deteriorated. For instance,
after P'yongyang refused to follow Peking's lead and boycott
the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, the Chinese Communists
accused the Koreans of betraying their friendship with
31
China and the entire revolutionary movement in Asia.
In January 1967, Peking reported the rumor that "there had
been a disturbance in North Korea and that Premier Kim had
been arrested by the army for having followed a revisionist 
. 32
line.” Yet, P'yongyang evidently wanted to maintain
relations with mainland China for a few months later
Nodonq Sinmun printed a pro-Chinese editorial under the
33
heading "The Aggressive Friendship Bound by Blood."
31An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Com­
munism . XV (1966), 68.
32
Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,"
Asian Survey. VIII (1968), 721. The Chinese charges were 
vehemently denyed, and countercharges of big-power chauvinism 
were leveled at Peking by the Korean Communists.
^ C h o , "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey. VIII
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Overall, the D.P.R.K.'s foremost obligation rested with
its self-image, causing it to adopt policies of political
independence and economic self-reliance and not those of
foreign states.
Similarly, throughout 1968, Kim Il-sung doggedly
clung to his independent line, criticizing the revisionism
of the Soviets and the dogmatism of the Chinese. He
cautioned against big-power chauvinism and proposed that
the principles of equality and mutual respect become the
34
basis of international Communism. P'yongyang's ideologi­
cal predilections toward the Peking line continued, xvhile 
its relations with Moscow became warmer and more intimate. 
As in previous years, this anomaly could be explained in 
terms of North Korea's perceived national interests.
However, Premier Kim fully realized that neither 
his policy of national independence nor his domestic 
accomplishments had enhanced the cause of unification.
The continued American presence south of the thirty-eighth 
parallel augmented the P'yongyang ruling elite's feelings 
of urgency and frustration. Desperate, Kim Il-sung con­
cluded that more forceful and adventuresome tactics must
34
Soon Sung C h o , "North and South Korea: Stepped-Up
Aggression and the Search for New Security," Asian Survey, 
IX (January, 1969), 36.
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be employed if he was ever to witness the "communization"
of the South.
Besides the omnipresent desire for reunification,
there were other, more immediate, reasons dictating an
intensification of the unification movement. For one
thing, the war in Vietnam, and the subsequent increase in
American investments in Asia, had erased South Korea's
35balance of payments deficit. Seoul's resulting prosperity 
dashed P'yongyang's hopes of appealing to the South Koreans 
with superior growth rates and low unemployemnt figures.
The Korean Communists realized that they could not compete 
indefinitely with a dynamic South Korea and, therefore, 
decided to act while conditions were still favorable*
In addition, the D.P.R.K* leadership was suffering 
from acute paranoia, believing the United States was 
plotting their ultimate destruction. Envisioning an 
American-sponsored North-East Treaty Organization —  
comprising Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea -- P'yongyang
saw itself encircled by foreign bases and threatened with
36 . .
nuclear war. These suspicxons led North Korean leaders
35Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier 
Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 109.
Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea,"
China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 36.
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to conclude that their international position in Asia could 
only deteriorate in the future and that immediate action 
was necessary to offset America's schemes.
Partly in retaliation against South Korea's participa­
tion in the Vietnamese War, North Korea had firmly committed 
itself to the defense of Communist North Vietnam by supplying 
Hanoi with arms and equipment. Thomas An stated, "It is 
not at all inconceivable that Peking may have urged P'yong­
yang to launch a Vietnam-like guerrilla war in South Korea,
partly in order to open a 'second front' which would drain
37American forces from Vietnam." Others have argued that
the North's intensification of violence in South Korea
was a self-initiated attempt to divert American attention
from Southeast Asia and was calculated to necessitate the
38
withdrawal of South Korean troops from Vietnam.
Nevertheless, the North Koreans were well aware that 
a significant portion of America's military power was tied 
down in Vietnam, presenting them with the opportunity 
to further advance their own interests. Ho Chi Minh's 
relative success -- if measured in terms of durability --
37An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Com­
munism , XV (1966), 71.
Q O
For example, see Run,"Behind North Korea's New
Belligerence," Reporter, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 21.
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with the National Liberation Front had impressed Kim Il- 
sung and had suggested the possibility of employing a 
similar strategy in South Korea. Therefore, even though 
Pyongyang's guerrilla activity has served as a second 
front for the Vietnamese War, this was not its sole in­
tended purpose.
In large measure, North Korea's decision to step up 
subversive activity in the South, like its posture in the 
Sino-Soviet dispute, was determined by Premier K i m ’s 
perception of his personal needs and interests as well as 
those of his regime. Koh remarked, Kim's "personal power 
and glory are inseparably bound up with the vicissitudes 
of the regxme he so firmly controls. Consequently,
a sober assessment of North Korea's international behavior 
must be predicated on an understanding of Kim Il-sung's 
power position. For he completely dominates the North 
Korean political system by simultaneously holding the 
positions of premier, party chairman, and marshall of 
the army. By controlling the three pillars of power, Kim 
II -sung is a one-man distillation of the North Korean regime
39Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective,” Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 265.
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40
itself, closely approximating Stalinist one-man rule.
By 1965, Premier Kim had purged all his potential rivals,
thus leaving his position virtually unassailable.
Kim Il-sung further enhanced his dominant position
by promoting a vigorous cult of personality to which all
North Koreans had to pay unlimited and unending homage.
Recent years have witnessed a marked increase in the c u l t ’s
vehemence as K i m ’s portraits are displayed in all public
places, his words of wisdom are tirelessly studied in
schools and factories, and his person is exalted as the
41’’beloved leader of the forty million Korean people. ”
Indeed, even Stalin would have been envious of K i m ’s 
esteemed position.
In addition, the personality cult has been rein­
forced by the "Guerrilla Myth" which exaggerates the partisan 
faction’s, and especially Kim Il-sung’s, role in achieving 
Korean independence. According to Paige, the m y t h ’s ob­
jectives "are to confirm faith in the final victory of 
Communism in Korea (even under trying circumstances the 
guerrillas never lost their faith in the eventual defeat
40Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties 
of Asia," Foreign Affairs. XLI'(1963), 324.
^Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism. XVIII
(1969), 19-20.
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of Japan) and to promote organizational loyalty (a major
reason, why success was possible was that the guerrillas
42were extremely self-sacrificing).” Hence, the partisan
faction, under K i m Ts direction and with the support of the
North Korean people,’ would achieve the reunification of
their divided homeland just as they had eventually brought
about Korean independence. The "Guerrilla Myth" also
contained two significant omissions: (1) Mao Tse-tung
was not mentioned as an expert in guerrilla warfare; and
(2) the myth did not contain any critical statements about
the use of violence. The latter caused Paige to remark
that "as an instrument of political socialization, this
n43myth would seem conducive to a propensity to violence. 
Through the promulgation of cult and myth, North Korea 
came to believe unification was imminent, and thus pressed 
their all-knowing, all-conquering premier to deliver his 
promises.
Perhaps, this was why Kim Il-sung adopted an ever- 
hardening line toward the overthrow of the South Korean 
government. More than anyone else, Kim realized that 
he could not keep North Korea in a constant state of
42
Paige, "Korea," p. 219.
43 Ibid.
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preparedness, driving his people to make endless sacrifices 
for the fatherland, without producing some concrete threat 
to their survival or some progress toward reunification. 
After twenty years in power, Kim's endurance was a testi­
mony to his skill of manipulating political power and mass 
consensus,but even such proficiency has its limits. Since 
anti-Americanism was becoming one of the strongest props 
under his dictatorship, Kim Il-sung was compelled to 
constantly heighten the tempo of his hate campaign against 
the United States by creating more novel and alarming evi­
dence of America’s evil designs. Therefore, the North 
Korean premier was gambling that an external threat would 
unify his people behind him and conceal his regime's 
apparent shortcomings.
To this end, the North Korean people had to be 
convinced that another Korean War was near at hand. Belli­
cose statements dominated the North Korean press, and
military spending was markedly increased, accounting for
44almost a third of the regime's budget in 1967. The regime 
boasted of its impressive military strength -- 350,000 
men, 500 Soviet-made jet aircraft, modern air-defense
44
Cho, "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey, VIII
(1968), 40.
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missile complexes, and a militia of 1.2 million men --
and their state of immediate readiness to defend the 
45
fatherland. Such a large military establishment, however, 
heavily taxed North Korea's limited resources.
In this respect, North Korea's firmer relations with 
the Soviet Union began to pay dividends. The Kremlin 
responded to P'yongyang's request for increased assistance 
with tanks, radar, jet aircraft, two Soviet W-class sub­
marines, four Komar-type guided-missile ships, and forty
46
motor torpedo boats. Besides giving the D.P.R.K. a
viable deterrent against foreign aggression, the Soviet 
arms build up strengthened the regime's revolutionary 
base, enabling it to aggrandize the guerrilla activities 
in the South.
In fact, the renewed guerrilla offensive posed a 
serious threat to Park Chung Hee's regime and was quite 
reminiscent of the tactics used by the North in the 1948 
to 1950 period. Instead of sending small reconnaissance 
missions across the De-Militarized Zone, or DMZ, the North 
Koreans now penetrated the South's defenses with well-organized
45Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII
(1969), 18.
4 A
Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 268-69.
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and well-armed platoons. North Korean commandos engaged 
in ambushes, mine-laying, dynamiting of barracks, and 
even in harassing the South Korean fishing fleet in inter-
i.
national waters. Indeed, the number of clashes between
North Korean raiders and South Korean and United Nations
forces multiplied rapidly; for example, in 1967 there was
a ten fold increase of such activity over the previous 
47
year alone.
Although the trend of Northern terrorism was expected 
to continue, Washington and Seoul never anticipated the 
intrepid format that it would assume in January 1968. In­
deed, the daring commando raid attempted on the "Blue House” 
(South Korea's Presidential palace) by thirty-one members
of a North Korean suicide squad on January 21, 1968, took
48
Seoul by complete surprise. The commandos nearly succeeded 
in accomplishing their objective of assassinating President 
Park and his top aides,for they came within eight hundred 
meters of the "Blue House" before being repulsed by South 
Korean policy forces. Once in custody, the sole survivor 
of the commando unit disclosed that "a total of 2,400 
commandos, all belonging to a special unit of the Korean
47For specific figures, see ibid., p. 272.
48For an account of the raid, see The New York Times, 
Jan. 22, 1968, p. 1.
Peoplefs Army formed in July 1967, were undergoing special
training in North Korea for guerrilla missions in the South.T
The same commando also stated that it was his understanding
that the D.P.R.K. would soon launch a major offensive in
compliance with its goal of forcibly unifying the Korean
50
peninsula by 1970.
Two days after the abortive raid on the presidential
palace, Kim Il-sung made one of his boldest moves since
the outbreak of the Korean War. On January 23, 1968, North
Korean patrol vessels captured the United States Navy1s
intelligence ship Pueblo and her crew of eighty-three men,
triggering an international crisis of major proportions.
Although Washington claimed the vessel was well outside
51
the recognized twelve mile limit, P ’yongyang charged 
that the ’’U.S. imperialist aggressor army . . . committed
a premeditated hostile act by infiltrating an armed ship
49Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 147.
~*^Koh, ’’The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 272.
^ B e f o r e  the naval court of inquiry in Coronado, 
California on January 21, 1969, Commander Bucher stated,
”At no time did I penetrate into the claimed territory of 
North Korea." He added, "The closest point we came to North 
Korea was 13.1 miles at some point along the coast." The 
New York Times, Jan. 22, 1969, p. 1.
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52into the coastal waters of our side in the east sea . . . "  
North Korean sources contended that the Pueblo was brought
into Wonsan harbor after its naval vessels "returned the
>
fire of the piratic gang, who put up an arrogant resistance," 
thus seizing "the warship of over 1,000 tons together with 
the anti-aircraft machine guns installed in it and scores 
of shooting weapons, tens of thousands of rounds of ammuni­
tion and hand grenades, and quantities of arms and equip-
53
ment for espionage activities," P'yongyang's portrayal 
of the Pueblo as part of an American invasion force con­
trasted sharply with Washington's version of the incident, 
the latter maintaining that the ship was on a routine
^intelligence gathering mission and that it was unequipped
54
to offer sustained resistance. The United States responded
to the North Korean provocation with a restrained behavior --
warning P'yongyang of the gravity of the situation and by
flexing its military muscles -- in an attempt to ease a
55
potentially volatile situation.
^2KCNA International Service in English, 0338 GMT,
Jan. 24, 1968. For transcript, see "Daily Reports,"
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Jan. 25, 1968.
53Ibid.
54See The New York Times, Jan. 24-28, 1968.
^~*At the time, the United States called up 14,787 air 
force and navy reservists and dispatched the nuclear- 
powered aircraft carrier Enterprise to the area. See ibid., 
Jan. 25-30, 1968.
166
Clearly, the PuebloTs seizure was neither a rash 
decision on the part of a North Korean naval commander nor 
part of an international Communist conspiracy, but rather 
a carefully premeditated "act that was planned and executed 
by Kim Il-sung's regime. Previous to the Pueblo incident, 
the North Korean government had issued repeated warnings 
against the violation of its territorial waters by "Ameri­
can spy ships," warnings that seem to have been ignored
5 6by North Korean watchers in Seoul and Washington. In
addition, the Pueblo's skipper, Commander Bucher, later
reported that he had sighted North Korean vessels on
various days before his ship's capture, thus enabling the
latter to relay the Pueblo Ts position to P'yongyang and
allowing time for a calculated response from the North
57
Korean capital.
Indeed, the polycentric nature of the Communist bloc 
negated the hypothesis that the Pueblo's capture was part 
of a well-coordinated international Communist plot to catch 
the United States off guard. General Jan Sejna, who defected
For example, warnings were issued on Nov. 11 and 
Dec. 21, 1967 as well as Jan. 8 and 12, 1968. For further 
details, see Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, 
XVIII (1969), 24.
57For reports of the sightings, see The New York 
Times, Jan. 22, 1969, p. 1.
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from Czechoslavakia, claimed that the Soviet Union engineered
58
the seizure of the Pueblo. According to Sejna, the 
morning following the Pueblo1s capture Soviet General 
Kusheher informed him of the event by stating, "During 
the night we learned that, with the collaboration of our 
Korean comrades, we have achieved a great success . . .  
Whereas Koh maintained that "given /North Korea 's/ in­
cessant apothesis of operational autonomy in the world 
arena and given the existence of a tacit understanding 
between Moscow and Washington regarding the operation of 
intelligence vessels . . . it is improbable that the
decision was instigated or cleared in advance with the 
Soviet U n i o n . T h e  fact that Senja's information has 
not always been reliable leaves K o h 1s argument the more 
convincing of the two. In regard to Communist China, Roy
Kim believed "it was not unlikely that the Pueblo incident
—  —  61
/was/ instigated by Peking," while Koh contended that
5 8
Jan Sejna, "Russia Plotted the Pueblo Affair," 
Reader's Dige s t . XCV (July, 1969), 73-76.
59 Ibid., p. 75.
^°Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 275.
^ R o y  U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,"
Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 722.
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such a prospect was "utterly out of the question. " 
Therefore, in all likelihood, North Korea acted alone, 
without the advice or consent of its allies.
Although the Pueblo Ts seizure was a seemingly brash 
act -- without any apparent provocation in Western eyes -- 
the North Koreans had reason to believe that such blatant 
harassment of the United States would serve a positive 
purpose, Korean unification. Actually, the Pueblo incident 
was little more than a manifestation of P'yongyang's 
"unification by force" policy; and, therefore, the reasons 
underlying the ship's capture were very similar to those 
already mentioned in connection with the North Korean 
regime's reorientation toward violent means of achieving 
the "communization" of the South.
In desperate need of propaganda issues at home and 
abroad, the Pueblo was used as a symbol by the North Korean 
regime to magnify the threat of American aggression. At 
home, such a device was needed to increase the vigilance 
and revolutionary fervor of the North Korean people.
Also, it had the intended purpose of covering up the 
regime's economic fai.lures and unsuccessful attempts at
^ K o h ,  "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 275.
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promoting reunification. After the event, Radio P Tyongyang 
constantly alerted the population of the danger of American 
imperialism by blaring, "The provocative act of U.S.
i.
imperialists ’ armed spy vessel is a new flagrant tramping
on the Korean armistice agreement, an open aggression
against the D.P.R.K., a link in the deliberate machinations
of the U.S. imperialists for touching off new war in Korea
and a grave menace to peace in the Far East and in the 
63
world.” The regime exhorted the population to resist 
the "reckless provocations" of the "U.S. imperialists 
and the traitorous Pak Chung-hui puppets" by increasing 
their production efforts and uniting more solidly behind 
Premier Kim to complete the task of revolution in the 
South.
Although the regime declared that "the heroic Korean
People’s Army -- which is prepared as an ever-vietorious
revolutionary armed force, each man a match for 100 enemies -~
will, in cooperation with all the Korean people, wipe out
64
the aggressors at one blow at any time," the incident was
^ P ’yongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0435 GMT,
Jan. 27, 1968. For translated transcript, see "Daily Reports," 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Jan. 28, 1968.
64
KCNA International Service in English, 0338 GMT,
Jan. 24, 1968. For transcript, see ibid., Jan. 25, 1968.
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needed to stimulate foreign military assistance, Kim 
Il-sung had to have some concrete evidence of intended 
American aggression in order to convince the Soviet Union
that he urgently required military hardware to counter
. . 65
the anticipated American offensive.
As most of North K o r e a ’s foreign and domestic policy
was formulated by the whims, caprices, and perceptions
of Kim Il-sung, few acts could have been more personally
gratifying for the premier than to seize an American
naval vessel. For such an incident could only raise his
ego by thrusting him into the center of the international
stage. Interestingly enough, the Pueblo was captured on
the eve of a preparatory meeting for a world Communist
party conference, causing speculation that Kim hoped the
affair would occupy the major portion of the conference’s 
66
attention.
Finally, the North Korean regime wanted to attack 
the American shield that had enabled South Korea to resist 
its endeavors toward reunification. In addition, the 
United States was held directly responsible for South
65Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier 
Kim,” The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 109.
^ C h o ,  "Korea: Election Year,” Asian Survey, VIII
(1968), 38.
K o r e a ’s economic prosperity and maturing political stability, 
which hindered North K o r e a ’s designs. Therefore, the 
Communist Koreans concluded that a direct blow at the United 
States might lead to an American re-evaluation of their 
involvement in South Korea as well as to retard the South’s 
economic growth by causing it to increase its military 
expenditures in response to P ’yongyang’s bellicosity.
Overall, then, North Korea’s actions may not have been as 
hasty and irrational as they appeared on the surface.
At least on a short term basis, the Pueblo’s seizure 
did produce a number of beneficial results for the North 
Korean regime. First, the vessel’s capture provided the 
regime with an invaluable propaganda tool, and throughout 
their eleven months in captivity, the crew with their 
alleged confession and news conferences was fully exploited 
for propaganda purposes. Second, for Kim Il-sung, it was 
a personal victory, boosting his stature among Communist 
and non-aligned nations and furthering his heroic image 
among his own people. Third, the incident created a 
temporary strain in American-South Korean relations.
Seoul was angered over its exclusion from the secret ne­
gotiations over the c r e w ’s return at P ’anmunjom and worried 
about Washington's conciliatory approach to the crisis.
Dong-A Ilbo, S e oul’s most influential newspaper, editorially
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lamented what it called "the diplomacy of humiliation"
being pursued by the United States, saying that the Korean
people were saddened by its myopic and "ungreat-power-like" 
67
behavior. Fourth, the intelligence ship was a virtual
gold mine for North K o r e a ’s, and presumedly Russia’s,
intelligence and counter-intelligence forces. At the
naval inquiry, Commander Bucher testified that "very close
to 100 percent" of the ship's sophisticated electronic
equipment had been destroyed before it fell into North
Korean hands but that "an unknown quantity" of top-secret
68
intelligence data had been seized by the raiding party.
And last, the incident did draw American attention away 
Tfrom Vietnam momentarily as American troop strength was 
augmented along the Korean DME and the carrier Enterprise 
was dispatched to the Wonsan Bay area.
But when viewing the consequences of the Pueblo 
incident in the perspective of North K o r e a ’s long-range 
objective of "communizing" the South, the results only 
could be considered to be disfunctional. For the United 
States became even more willing to help combat the threat 
of Communism in Korea in the wake of North K o r e a ’s hostile
Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p..153.
The New York Times, Jan. 21, 1969, p. 1.
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act. Within weeks, the Republic of Korea's armed forces
received "modern jets, a destroyer, air defense missiles,
radar, anti-infiltration devices, rifles, and ammunition
69
from the United States." In addition, President Johnson
pledged $100 million in special military aid to South
Korea and dispatched Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus
70
Vance to Seoul for secret consultations. Thus, South 
Korea's military shield was strengthened by military hard­
ware and a firm commitment from the United States that it 
would prevent a Communist takeover in the South. Actually, 
the only positive purpose that the Pueblo incident served 
in the long-run was to expose the Achilles' heel of the 
United States, s h o w m g  a superpower s vulnerability to 
the humiliating harassments of a "fourth rate" power.
However, the Pueblo incident did win increased 
Soviet and Chinese Communist support for North Korea's 
position. In fact, the Soviet delegate to the United 
Nations acted as the guardian of North Korean interests 
in the Security Council debate over the Pueblo in January 
1968. Throughout, the Russians were very cautious not to
69
Ibid., Feb. 23, 1968, p. 1.
70Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective, "- Asian 
Survey, IX (1969), 278.
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jeoparadize their newly acquired rapprochement with North
Korea and thus refused to accept indirect American requests
that the Kremlin assume the role of peacemaker in the
dispute. For if the Soviets had offered advice on the
delicate political situation, the P ’yongyang leadership
would have surely sighted it as evidence of Moscow's
inclination ”to preach class collaboration and to give
71up to imperialism." Therefore, Moscow merely stated 
that the situation was like "a powderkeg, liable to ex­
plode into a w a r ” and claimed that the solution rested in
a complete evacuation of United States forces from the 
72
peninsula. Although the Chinese Communists delayed 
the news of the Pueblo *s capture for two days, they like­
wise voiced full support for "the just stand of the Korean
Government and people in countering U.S. imperialism's
73
flagrant violation."
After eleven months of secret negotiations at P'anmunjom,
71
Run, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence,"
Reporter, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 20.
72
Moscoxv Domestic Service in Russian, 1830 GMT,
Jan. 30, 1968. For translated transcript, see "Daily 
Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Jan. 31,
1968.
^ N C N A  International Service in English, 1837 GMT,
Jan. 28, 1968. For transcript, see ibid., Jan. 29, 1968.
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the North Koreans released the eighty-two surviving members
of the Pueblo crew. The terms of the final settlement
were rather bizarre because they included an American
admission of its alleged guilt in addition to an advanced
74
oral repudiation of the admission. The circumstances
surrounding the c r e w Ts release were just as enigmatic as
those that triggered the incident. Perhaps, Kim Il-sung
desired to end the whole affair before President-elect
Nixon took office, fearing he would prove to be more 
75
intractable. But more than likely, the crew’s use­
fulness as a propaganda tool had been exhausted. For by 
December 1968, the North Koreans probably could have cared 
less about the crew, knowing that its ’’victory” in the 
eyes of the Communist world and their own people could 
never be erased by American counterclaims or denials.
Therefore, the Pueblo incident was part of North 
K o r e a ’s attempts to establish a viable self-image. The 
sh i p ’s seizure, like the "military line" and the rapproche­
ment with the Soviet Union, was designed to further the
74
The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1968, p. 1.
75
However, President N i x o n ’s behavior proved to be 
the same as his predessor’s when North Korean planes shot 
down a U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane, killing its 
crew of thirty-one men, on April 15, 1969.
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regime’s ultimate goal of Korean reunification under the 
direction of Premier Kim Il-sung. In each instance, P ’yong 
y a n g ’s perceived self-interests had dictated the drastic, 
and sometimes even adventurous, change in policy. As yet 
unification has evaded Kim Il-sung’s perseverance. Now 
the question remains whether or not Premier Kim, in his 
frustration, will trigger a fatal response for himself 
and/or his regime by his next aggressive actions.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, the D.P.R.K. has evolved 
from Soviet satellite status to a nation which is vehemently 
asserting and pursuing its political and economic in­
dependence. After its liberation from Japan, K o rea’s 
greatest political aspiration was for national independence. 
But instead of emancipation from external domination, the 
divided peninsula became a cold war battleground for the 
great powers. In the North, the population’s desire for 
independence and self-determination was thwarted by the 
U.S.S.R.’s successful effort to integrate the northern 
zone of occupation into the Soviet orbit. Although Stalin 
purposely established a puppet 'Korean" regime in P ’yong- 
yang to avert the danger of arousing Korean xenophobia 
and to protect the Soviet Union from his own well-known 
charges of ’’Asian colonialism,” the Soviet premier’s
scheme failed to eradicate the population’s nationalist 
1
sentiments.
1U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 119.
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From 1945 to 1950, the Soviet Union’s policies with 
respect to North Korea, especially in the area of foreign 
trade, were quite reminiscent of those previously employed 
by Imperial Japan. Enjoying rapid success, the Soviet- 
dominated hierarchy became so well-entrenched in North 
Korea, that the Kremlin felt confident enough to withdraw 
its troops by the end of 1948. Hoivever , the Soviet triumph 
was short-lived. For Communist China’s intervention in 
the Korean War initiated a weakening of the Soviet integra­
tive pattern.
The disillusionment and frustration generated by 
the Soviet Union’s failure to come to their assistance 
as the United Nations forces were overrunning the peninsula 
caused North Korean leaders to reevaluate their country’s 
Soviet tutelage. Consequently, when faced with the enor­
mous task of post-war reconstruction, the P'yongyang 
government stressed a policy of self-reliance in order 
to compensate for Moscow’s unpredictability of action.
This move toward greater self-emphasis was correlated with 
certain attempts to diversify its foreign relations both 
within and without the Communist system. Actually, North 
K o rea’s policy of self-reliance served a dual purpose, for 
it not only multiplied the possible sources of foreign 
assistance and created competition amongst them but benefited
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the cause of unification as well by presenting a facade 
of political independence to the South Koreans. Still, 
Soviet hegemony did not vanish overnight. It was not 
until 1955 —  two years after Stalin’s death —  that 
Premier Kim began to issue ideological pronouncements 
emphasizing North K o rea’s political autonomy and only in 
the aftermath of the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress of the 
CPSU that P ’yongyang dared to deviate from Soviet policy 
direction.
North K o r e a ’s experimentation with various ideologi­
cal methods of national development, and its eventual 
alliance with Communist China in the widening Sino-Soviet 
dispute, sprang from a complex web of perceived national 
interests, capabilities, and deficiencies. The changes 
in policy direction were, in fact, "a product of the
interaction between internal needs and external opportuni-
2
ties.” On the one hand North Korea coveted rapid moderni­
zation, while on the other it was no longer dependent solely 
upon Soviet economic assistance and protection. Red China, 
having risen in international status, now represented a 
viable alternative to the Soviet Union. Internally, the 
rising national consciousness of North Koreans demanded
2Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 51.
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more independence in international affairs. In addition, 
the North Korean leadership realized that their country had 
now outgrown the peripheral status accorded it by the 
Soviet Union. P ’yongyang's deviation from the Moscow line, 
supposedly aimed at political non-alignment and economic 
independence, was in large measure a reaction to the 
Kremlin's resented neo-colonialist policies.
In truth, North Korea never did implement a non- 
aligned foreign policy. Instead, P ’yongyang followed a 
policy of flexible neutralism in that it was non-aligned 
only with respect to certain issues. Although the con­
cept of an ’’independent” foreign policy is theoretically 
correct, North Korea could not realistically pursue foreign 
policy objectives as if the country was situated in an 
international vaccuum where only its domestic self-interests 
counted. Since North Korea lacked the essential pre­
conditions of political and economic power that enable 
states to act with a minimum of external restraint in the 
international sphere, it was bound irreconcilably to the 
wishes and desires of the more powerful Communist states.
For example, P'yongyang declared its independence from 
Soviet policy direction only with the protection of Com­
munist China. Therefore, regardless of the fact that 
North Korea expounded an ’’independent” line, the state
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was not, nor could it be, truely independent.
Moreover, the policy of non-alignment did not cor­
respond to North K o r e a ’s true national interests. Although 
aimed at stimulating the country’s economic development, 
the policy actually had a reverse effect in that it proved 
to be detrimental to North K o r e a ’s economic growth. Faced 
with P ’yongyang’s ambiguous policy of independence, the 
Soviet Union resorted to severe sanctions to bring the 
Korean Communists back into the Soviet fold. Curtailment 
of Soviet economic assistance noticeably hampered the 
D.P.R.K.’s Seven Year Plan, and cutbacks in Russian military 
aid reduced North K o r e a ’s offensive and defensive capabilities. 
After finding itself virtually isolated from the Communist 
community, the North Korean regime came to the realization 
that its national self-interests would be best served by 
a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Thus, North K o r e a ’s 
foreign policy of "independence” between 1956 and 1965 
failed to produce positive results because it had not 
been a policy of national interests conditioned by a 
realistic assessment of international circumstances.
North K o r e a ’s contemporary foreign policy which has 
brought about a reconciliation with the Soviet Union has 
not sacrificed its national interests but rather enhanced 
them by taking the realities of international politics
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into account. After establishing a rapprochement with the 
U.S.S.R., the North Korean regime reaped the benefits of 
renewed Soviet economic and military assistance so necessary 
for the pursuit of its national objectives. In addition, 
the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.S.R. seem to have reached a tacit 
understanding that the latter will tolerate P ’yongyangTs 
independent actions within certain bounds. For example, 
North Korea was free to spell out its independent position 
in the Nodonq Sinmum editorial of August 12, 1966. A 
more graphic illustration of North Korea’s independence 
can be seen in the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. In 
capturing an American intelligence vessel, Kim Il-sung’s 
government demonstrated that it was still capable of 
embarking on a self-directing course of action. In the 
last case, the Soviet Union overlooked North Korea’s 
belligerent behavior, for it did not draw itself into a 
direct confrontation with the United States or hamper its 
relations with the P ’yongyang regime.
Throughout, the ideology and strategy of P ’yongyang’s 
foreign policy have remained remarkably constant in that 
it has always pursued the obj'ectives of communization and 
modernization. As correspondent Wilfred Burchett noted,
"the question of reunification of Korea is listed as a 
maj'or national task to be accomplished during the ’life
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of the present generation1 as everyone from Premier Kim
3
on down expresses it." By creating a modernized state,
the North Korean leadership hopes to achieve its paramount
objective of communizing South Korea. Not only would
modernization give North Korea the potential economic and
military capability to conquer the South by force of arms,
but, more importantly, it would create an attractive self-
image to the South Koreans that might pursuade them to
peacefully integrate into a Communist-controlled, united
Korea. Therefore, the twin goals of communization and
modernization are inseparable, and both "emanate from
and are guided by the ideologies of Communism and national- 
4
ism. "
While the strategic foreign policy obj’ectives have 
remained unchanged, the tactics employed in pursuing them 
have responded to the constantly changing internal and 
external conditions. For example, P ’yongyang over the last 
two decades has adopted numerous tactical moves subordinated 
to the following operational directions of its foreign 
policy: (1) non-alignment in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
(2) alliance with Communist China, (3) reconciliation
^The New York Times, May 15, 1967, p. 1.
4K°h, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 218.
with the Soviet Union, (4) forceful takeover of South 
Korea, (5) psychological warfare against South Korea,
(6) guerrilla activities in South Korea, and (7) extension 
of relations with the nations of the Third World. Each 
change in direction has been a product of North Korea’s 
self-assessment of its political, economic, and military 
capabilities, discernment of its current relations with 
Moscow and Peking, and perception of the internal situation 
in South Korea.
Such changes in operational direction have given 
P ’yongyang somewhat of an oscillating posture in the 
Sino-Soviet dispute. For North K o r e a ’s position has 
been largely determined by its efforts to construct a 
viable self-image. In other words, national self-interest 
reigns paramount and dictates that North Korea all}?' with 
whichever Communist giant that can best enhance its 
-tactical drive for reunification and modernization at 
a given time. For example, although P ’yongyang still 
remains more closely allied with Peking on ideological 
issues, it now backs Mosc o w ’s position for pragmatic 
reasons correlated to its national goals and present 
operational direction. Therefore, national self-interest 
is the primary criterion determining North K o r e a ’s posi­
tion in the Sino-Soviet dispute and accounts for the
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fact that P !yongyang has periodically emulated Soviet 
and Chinese behavior in an effort to obtain the best that 
both have to offer.
Overall, the D.P.R.K. has enjoyed mixed success in 
achieving its major obj'ectives of communization and 
modernization. A review of North Korean reunification 
attempts since 1945 suggests that forceful, direct methods 
have been unsuccessful, while tactics involving peripheral 
political violence seem to have brought more favorable 
long-run results. But the attainment of Communist con­
trol over the entire peninsula seems highly unlikely as 
long as America maintains its military presence in South 
Korea. Still, the North Korean regime’s notable strides 
toward modernization in the last two decades have enabled 
the P fyongyang regime to construct a self-image that 
has increased its power and international prestige. As 
a result, North Korea has consistantly gained support for 
its position on reunification, especially from Third
5
World states in the United Nations General Assembly.
Yet, the future of Korea remains uncertain. The threat 
of political violence continues to lurk j'ust below the
“*For a list of nations supporting North Korea in 
the United Nations from 1965 to 1967, see ibid., chart 3, 
p. 183.
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surface status quo as the North adamantly adheres to a 
policy of eventual conquest of all Korea by exhorting 
its people to "Carry the hammer and sickel in one hand 
and a gun in the other.”
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